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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing and conflicting uses of water have been widely her-
alded as one of the major environmental crises facing society. Be-
low average rainfall in recent years has caused municipal water
shortages in Virginia, particularly in the rapidly growing areas of
the southeastern part of the state, evidence that water quantity
problems are no longer a phenomenon peculiar to the western
states. Generally, those in Virginia who advocate reallocation of
water to areas of the state experiencing such shortages feel that the
state has enough water, just not all in the correct places.
These advocates of reallocation have proposed a "solution:" to
transfer water out of areas (drainage basins) of the Commonwealth
with excess water supplies to those areas (other drainage basins)
with deficient supplies. Such practices, called "inter-basin trans-
fers," have interesting legal ramifications under Virginia's riparian
doctrine. Already one major project, the proposed Virginia Beach-
Lake Gaston water pipeline, is the subject of heated political con-
troversy and possible interstate litigation.' Other water uses-both
consumptive and non-consumptive-will further burden Virginia's
water resources. Added to naturally-increasing demands for agri-
cultural and municipal water supplies are proposals for one or
more coal slurry pipelines2 and increasing interest in small hydro-
power projects.
Much of the dispute over water resources has focused on the po-
litical issues involved. The interbasin transfer controversy, for ex-
ample, tends to be viewed solely as a quarrel between jurisdictions
over the right to exploit an economic resource. The more impor-
tant question-the requirements of the natural systems supplying
1. City of Virginia Beach proposed water withdrawal from Lake Gaston. Joint Federal-
State Notice NAOOP-P 83-0747-06. See Beach Applies for Pipeline Permit, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, July 20, 1983, at BI, col. 2.
2. See H.B. 479, 1984 Va. Gen. Assem., a bill considered by Virginia's 1984 legislative
session which, if passed, would have allowed development of an intra-state coal slurry pipe-
line. 1984 HousE JOURNAL __. See also Note, Coal Slurry Pipeline, 17 U. RicH. L. REV.
789 (1983).
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the water-tends to be relegated to secondary status. After all, a
free-flowing stream is primarily a life support system supplying
many needs other than the economy. Such a stream can support
human needs compatibly with others, but only if artificial inter-
ruptions are conducted with carefully-tailored controls based on a
full understanding of the stream as a living system. As with any
resource, exploitation beyond the stream's carrying capacity leads
to degradation and destruction.
The definition of the term "excess" water quantity raises imme-
diate environmental concerns. How much water can be diverted
from a natural aquatic system and how much can its characteris-
tics be changed without exceeding its carrying capacity, doing un-
acceptable harm to indigenous aquatic ecosystems and reducing
the stream's capacity to support other uses? Research conducted
by federal and state agencies indicates both that technical answers
to this question are possible and that management procedures can
be developed to ensure that low flows are adequate to support
aquatic ecosystems.3 Clear and consistent regulatory requirements
are necessary to ensure that economic uses are compatible with in-
stream demands. To achieve such a balancing, regulators must de-
velop both a means of determining instream needs and a means of
implementing and enforcing them.
Many states have taken steps to examine these needs and some
have implemented programs to assure stream flow maintenance.4
Virginia's constitutional and statutory foundations are fully ade-
quate to support a stream flow regulatory program, but no such
program is in place. This article will examine briefly the ecological
basis for requiring minimum stream flows, discuss the water and
land uses that most affect stream flow, and survey the common,
constitutional, and statutory law that relates to the maintenance of
ecologically-based minimum stream flows in Virginia streams. The
current regulatory program for stream flow maintenance in Vir-
ginia will be examined, and suggestions will be made for its
improvement.
3. See, e.g., Gregory, Preliminary Draft of an Environmental Flowby Policy for Virginia
(Virginia State Water Control Board) (Nov. 24, 1982).
4. See infra notes 388-402 and accompanying text.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
II. FLOW MAINTENANCE ISSUES AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS
A. Activities Affecting Stream Flow Maintenance
A number of existing and potential projects, both public and pri-
vate, have the capability of significantly affecting stream flows, to
the point where flow maintenance issues would need to be ad-
dressed by appropriate public and private sector decision-makers
through various state and federal regulatory processes. Impound-
ments for such varied purposes as hydropower, public or industrial
water supply, recreation, and flood control, as well as practices
such as stream channelization, are the most notable examples of
"non-consumptive" uses that interrupt the normal flow regimes5 of
streams. These uses can change the physical and chemical charac-
teristics of stream water to the point of adversely affecting indige-
nous aquatic ecosystems. Large scale withdrawals for on-site "con-
sumptive" uses, such as industyial process or cooling water, may
also affect downstream flow conditions, particularly at the critical
periods of late summer and spring spawning runs. Interbasin trans-
fers resulting in the export of water for such consumptive purposes
as municipal water supply, coal transportation, or major industrial
use could also result in stream flow diminution to the point of ad-
versely affecting the stream's capacity to support aquatic life and
other "instream" uses, such as recreation and aesthetic enjoyment.
Fluctuations of the flow regime naturally occur in unaltered free-
flowing streams. Flows tend to peak in the spring and winter, while
reaching their lowest points in the late summer and early fall. Oc-
casionally, these natural conditions by themselves will cause
stream flow to be diminished below the point necessary to support
instream demands. These patterns are relatively consistent over
time and indigenous ecosystems have evolved an ability to tolerate
the stresses of such fluctuations. Man-induced changes, like those
discussed above, will increase fluctuations in both directions, but
tend to produce low flows, particularly in the late summer and
early fall, when many of these human uses are at their peak. Addi-
tionally, largely unregulated agricultural water uses, such as irriga-
tion and stock watering, reach their highest point during the low
flow season in late summer and early fall.
At certain times during normal flow regimes, stream flows can
5. A flow regime is the "[c]ondition of a stream with respect to its rate of flow, as mea-
sured by the volume of water passing different cross-sections at a given time." M. LANDY,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT GLOSSARY 251 (1979).
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drop below instantaneous levels. Such drops in stream flows are
occurring with increasing frequency in the absence of any regula-
tory policy on low flows induced by human uses. The stress levels
resulting from these low flows can cause significant damage to in-
digenous biota of the stream.
The flow level above which this biologically defined damage does
not occur, where indigenous aquatic life is sustained throughout
the year, is called an "aquatic base flow."' Several methods for de-
termining such an aquatic base flow have been developed, but none
has gained universal acceptance.7 Even where the average flow is
maintained at the level of the aquatic baseflow, damage can occur
without proper flow regulation. Large, intermittent releases from
impoundments, for example, may alternate with interim periods of
little or no release, causing bottom scouring,' bank erosion,
temperature fluctuations, destruction of bottom-dwelling popula-
tions and impairment of spawning.
B. Federal and State Permit Requirements
There is no lack of regulatory "handles" on projects affecting
aquatic baseflow. As this article will discuss, virtually any activity
that can conceivably impair or alter stream flow is or can be sub-
ject to some regulatory requirements under existing statutes. None
of these statutes, however, directly address stream flow considera-
tions, and the regulatory process in Virginia deals with stream flow
issues only peripherally in the context of permitting and licensing
procedures. Furthermore, while there is substantial federal involve-
ment in licensing of projects that affect stream flow, the state is
typically left to establish the necessary requirements either sepa-
rately or as conditions for a federal license.
Projects that affect stream flow to any significant degree will al-
most certainly require one or more of the following permits:
Rivers and Harbors Act Permits: Section 10 of the 1899 Rivers
and Harbors Act9 prohibits construction in or alteration of the
6. Gregory, supra note 3.
7. Id. Table 1 of this document reviews the applicability of sixteen currently proposed
methods for use by the Virginia State Water Control Board. See also Tarlock, Appropria-
tion for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water
Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 211, 217-20 (discussing various methodologies reviewed by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's cooperative Instream Flow Service Group).
8. "Bottom scouring" refers to the abrading or wearing away of stream beds. M. LANDY,
supra note 5, at 170.
9. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
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navigable waters of the United States1° without a permit from the
Army Corps of Engineers. Section 911 prohibits construction of any
dam or dike across any navigable water of the United States with-
out congressional consent and approval of the plans by the Corps
of Engineers.' 2
Clean Water Act, Section 404 Permits: Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act' s prohibits the discharge of any dredged or fill material
into the waters of the United States without a permit from the
Corps of Engineers. 14 Numerous activities involving construction,
stream alteration, etc., require 404 permits.'5
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Licenses: Part I of the
Federal Power Act" empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to issue licenses for dams, conduits, reser-
voirs, and other works necessary for the development, transmission
and utilization of hydroelectric power.17 Construction, operation, or
maintenance of such a facility requires a FERC license.' 8 The
Commission's jurisdiction under the Act is coextensive with Con-
gress's control over navigable waters under the Commerce Clause.'9
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licenses: A less commonly-en-
10. Navigable waters of the United States are those waters which are presently used, have
been used, or may be used with reasonable improvement, for interstate or foreign commerce.
33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1983).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
12. 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(a) (1983).
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, § 404, as amended by Pub. L.
No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 884 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982)) [here-
inafter cited as the Clean Water Act].
14. The term "navigable waters", used in the Clean Water Act is defined in section
502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982), as "waters of the United States including the territorial
seas." This is a far broader jurisdictional scope than that of the Rivers and Harbors Act,
supra note 10, and includes virtually all bodies of water and adjacent wetlands. 33 C.F.R. §
323.2 (1983). See Minnehana Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir.
1979) (comparing the jurisdiction of the two acts).
15. 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(1), 323.3 (1983).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823(a) (1982).
17. Id. § 797(e).
18. Id. § 817.
19. Id. § 797(e). This jurisdiction is defined at id. § 796(8) to incorporate those parts of
streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce and which, in their natural or improved condition,
are suitable for transporting persons or property in interstate or foreign commerce. If the
waters in question do not meet the traditional navigability test, but Congress nonetheless
has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, FERC must determine whether the project
would affect the interests of interstate commerce and, if so, a license is required. Any person
proposing to construct a dam or other works for hydropower generation must apply to
FERC for a determination of applicability. Id. § 817.
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countered license for electric power operation is the federal license
required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nuclear power
plants.20 These power plants affect stream flow primarily by im-
poundment of water for cooling purposes. 21 Fossil fuel plants may
also require cooling water impoundments, but because the federal
government is not the primary project licensor for those facilities,
the impoundments are licensed under the Corps of Engineers pro-
grams described above.
All of these federal agencies are required by their own statutes
and regulations, as well as by overlying federal statutes such as the
National Environmental Policy Act 22 and the Endangered Species
Act,2 3 to weigh the effects of proposed projects on water quality,
fish and wildlife, aquatic habitat, and numerous other environmen-
tal factors when making licensing decisions. The regulations of
these agencies provide for coordination and consultation with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife agencies to determine these environmental
effects.24
Clean Water Act, Section 401 Certification: In addition, section
401 of the Clean Water Act 26 requires any applicant for a federal
license or permit for any activity that may result in a discharge of
a pollutant to the waters of the United States2 6 to obtain certifica-
tion from the state in which the discharge originates so that the
project will comply with applicable water quality standards and
limitations. The state may condition certification on the incorpora-
tion of specific requirements in the federal license (e.g., stream
flow maintenance).27 This is a powerful tool for aquatic baseflow
regulation, but it places a heavy responsibility on the states to de-
velop adequate provisions for determining and implementing flow
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1982).
21. Lake Anna in Virginia was constructed for this purpose by impounding the North
Anna River.
22. See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c(1982) (requiring
that agencies involved in water resource development projects consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service before undertaking the project; 50 C.F.R. pt. 402 (1983) (requiring federal
agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service if any agency activity could affect an
endangered species); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (1983) (requiring the Corps of Engineers to give
"great weight" to state fish and wildlife recommendations in setting permit terms and
conditions).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
26. "Waters of the United States" for the purposes of § 401 certification is given the
broad construction of the Clean Water Act definition. See supra note 14.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d).
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requirements. Federal licensing agencies defer to state preferences
in this area because of a desire not to impinge on state perogatives
over water allocation. Thus, adequate baseflow programs must be
developed at the state level.2 8
I Virginia Permitting Requirements: In addition to, or in some
cases instead of these federal licensing requirements, Virginia law
imposes various permitting requirements on projects that affect
state waters.2 9 For example, the State Water Control Law prohibits
any activity that affects the physical, chemical or biological proper-
ties of state waters without a permit.30 This program has not been
applied directly to regulation of stream flow, but such an applica-
tion is possible.
Certain uses of state-owned subaqueous lands require a permit
from the Virginia Marine Resources Commission.31 Other state
programs require permits for impoundment of surface and flood-
waters,32 construction of dams associated with generating facili-
ties,33 and construction in state-designated Scenic River areas.3 4
All of these state programs could be used as the authority for
aquatic baseflow protection. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth of
Virginia does not have an articulated aquatic base flow policy. In
its 401 certification process and in other cases where it considers
flow requirements, Virginia usually relies on the "7Q10" low flows5
which relates, not to biologic community maintenance, but rather
to maintenance of instream water quality standards. Aquatic base
flow is dealt with more coherently in the federal processes, but
28. That is not to say that the federal government has been inactive. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, for example, has developed much technical and procedural information in
this area, both for use in projects affecting federal lands and for transfer to state agencies.
These requirements, however, are not regulatory.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3(4) (Repl. Vol. 1982) defines "state waters" as all waters
above or below ground located in the state regardless of their navigability.
30. Id. §§ 62.1-44.5, -44.15(5).
31. Id. § 62.1-3.
32. Id. §§ 62.1-104 to -115.
33. Id. §§ 62.1-80 to -103 (requiring the State Corporation Commission license to dam a
waterway for production of hydroelectric power); id. §§ 62.1-115.1 to -115.10 (requiring
State Water Control Board inspection of all dams); id. §§ 62.1-116 to -127 (requiring leave
of court to dam a watercourse).
34. Id. § 10-174 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (providing that no dam can be built on a river desig-
nated as a "Scenic River" under this chapter without express authorization of the General
Assembly).
35. The "7Q10" low flow is the lowest flow which, statistically, would occur for a seven-
day period once every ten years. State Water Control Board, Water Quality Standards §
1.03 (rev. ed. 1982).
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still, even at the federal level in Virginia, substantive issues will be
determined by state law. Thus, it is critical for Virginia to develop
a clear, articulated low-flow policy.
III. FEDERAL LAW AND INSTREAM FLOW
Section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act states that:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each state to allo-
cate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be super-
seded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the fur-
ther policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. 6
Despite the considerable deference traditionally given to state au-
thority, however, numerous federal laws are important, both proce-
durally and substantively, in the area of water law. The discussion
that follows will emphasize the three federal statutes that have
substantive influence on instream flow maintenance; the Federal
Power Act,37 the Endangered Species Act,38 and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act. 9 A number of federal laws that have merely
procedural requirements for consideration of instream flow mainte-
nance will also be discussed." We will begin with one of these, the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),41 because NEPA pro-
vides the overall federal framework for consideration of environ-
mental impacts. It should be reiterated, though, that these federal
statutes can only augment state efforts toward stream flow mainte-
nance, they cannot replace them. While federal agencies can assist
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-823a (1982). See infra notes 60-91 and accompanying text.
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543. See infra notes 92-113 and accompanying text.
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287. See infra notes 114-133 and accompanying text.
40. Other federal laws that relate indirectly to stream flow maintenance include: Federal
Water Project Recreation Act of 1977, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4602-12 to -21 (1982); Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified at scattered
sections of Titles 7, 16, 30, 40, & 43 U.S.C.); Watershed Protection and Flood Protection
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1009 (1982); 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1982) (governing the President's power
to establish National Forests); Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-
531; National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). For a more exhaustive discussion of these and
other federal laws, see Heath, Protection of Instream Flows in Legal and Administrative
Systems for Water Allocation and Management: Options for Change 107-177 (1984) (Vir-
ginia Water Resources Research Center). See also State Water Control Law, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:7 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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state governments and provide technical assistance, the ultimate
responsibility for establishing an operative aquatic base flow policy
for Virginia lies with the state.
A. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)4 2 is
perhaps the most important federal statute discussed here because
it establishes both the general environmental policy of Congress
and, more significantly, a strenuous procedural framework for
making environmentally sensitive agency decisions. NEPA's policy,
set forth in section 101, is "to use all practicable means and mea-
sures. . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans. ' '43 This protective mandate is weakened somewhat by
the requirement that such efforts use "practicable means, consis-
tent with other essential considerations of national policy." '44 No
substantive rights to a healthful environment are created; Congress
merely "recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment. 45
The Act does, however, set forth a formidable array of proce-
dural requirements designed to encourage government agencies to
make responsible decisions concerning the environmental impact
of all major federal actions. For example, section 102, the heart of
NEPA, requires, among other things: a systematic approach to
planning and decisionmaking which utilizes natural and social sci-
ences and the environmental design arts; consideration of unquan-
tified environmental amenities; and a detailed statement included
in every recommendation or report which specifically addresses the
environmental impact of the proposed action, alternatives to the
proposal, short and long term effects on the productivity of the
environment, and irreversible commitments of resources associated
with the proposed action.46
42. Id.
43. Id. § 4331(a).
44. Id. § 4331(b) (1976).
45. Id. § 4331(c).
46. Id. § 4332. The text, in full provides:
(1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-
[Vol. 18:485
1984] STREAM FLOW MAINTENANCE
Early decisions of a majority of federal circuits interpreted this
section of NEPA to place substantive requirements on federal
agencies 47 "to develop new procedures to accomplish the innova-
tive task of implementing NEPA through rulemaking. '4  The
United States Supreme Court, however, overturned this interpreta-
tion in 1978 in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,49 holding that the procedural protec-
tions of NEPA are limited to those found "in the plain language of
the Act." 50
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this Act, which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and techni-
cal considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such
statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall
be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the
public as provided by section 552 of title 5 and shall accompany the proposal through
the existing agency review process.
47. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282
(1st Cir. 1973); Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Conser-
vation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975). But see Lathan v. Brine-
gar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir.
1973).
48. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
49. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
50. Id. at 548 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976)).
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The lower court in Vermont Yankee,51 applying a process of
"hybrid rulemaking, ' 52 had determined that the rulemaking proce-
dures followed by the agency, though complying with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) 53 were inadequate to assess environ-
mental risks. The court had ordered the agency to improve its
procedures and produce a comprehensive record.54 The Supreme
Court, however, found nothing in NEPA to indicate a "repeal by
implication of any other statute,' 55 and concluded that NEPA
clearly "cannot serve as the basis for a substantial revision of the
carefully constructed procedural specifications of the APA."56
By this ruling, the Supreme Court limited the scope of a court's
inquiry into procedures an agency follows under NEPA. So long as
the agency has met the statutory minimum of the APA, the re-
viewing court cannot set aside the agency action unless that action
is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.57 The court is not
free to substitute its judgment for the agency's5" or to require the
51. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 663
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
52. See Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977); South Terminal
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 665-66 (1st Cir. 1974); Mobile Oil Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking"
Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L.
REv. 401 (1975).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
54. 547 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
55. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548 (quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP,
422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975) and United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973)).
56. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548.
57. Judge Butzner, in Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 219-20 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), outlined the proper steps for judicial review after Ver-
mont Yankee. He further described the court's role in a subsequent article:
The court must determine (1) whether the authority to make the regulations is found
in the statutes; (2) whether the procedures followed by the agency were lawful; and
(3) whether the plan is constitutional. If these requirements are met, the challenged
regulation may not be set aside unless it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion." In arriving at that determination, the court must "engage in a
substantial inquiry" into the reasonableness of the agency's decision. As a part of that
inquiry, it must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgement. The court
must not substitute its judgement for that of the agency to whom Congress has en-
trusted the responsibility for making the substantive decision. Nevertheless, the rec-
ord must indicate that all relevant factors were weighed by the agency, and it must
show how the agency reached its decision.
Butzner, 4 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J. No. 2 (1979).
58. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410
n.21 (1976)). The Court reiterated this holding in Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980), noting that the Court cannot "interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken." Id. at 227-28 (quoting
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agency to follow more rigorous procedures 9
NEPA remains, however, a powerful tool for forcing agency con-
sideration of environmental concerns affecting major federal
projects. Proponents of maintaining adequate aquatic base flows
still have an avenue, through substantive participation in the ad-
ministrative process leading to the development of a NEPA-man-
dated environmental impact statement, for airing concerns about
stream flow maintenance.
B. Federal Power Act
The Federal Water Power Act of 1920,60 now the Federal Power
Act, was the result of early attempts by conservationists to con-
struct a comprehensive regulatory scheme for development of the
Nation's water power resources.6 1 Section 10(a) of the Act condi-
tions the licensing of a project on the requirement:
That the project adopted .. .shall be such as in the judgment of
the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and
utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial
public uses, including recreational purposes .... 62
This section has become a potent weapon for close scrutiny of
hydroelectric projects. The term "recreational purposes" "encom-
passes the conservation of natural resources [as well as] the main-
tenance of natural beauty and the preservation of historic sites."' 3
Under this section of the Act, the Federal Power Commission, now
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 64 has denied licenses
Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21).
59. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548.
60. Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c
(1982)).
61. See Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9 (1945).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
63. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 614
(2d Cir. 1965) (Scenic Hudson I) (citing Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
216 F.2d 509, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1954)), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
64. The Federal Power Commission was dissolved and its functions under § 10(a) were
transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(a)(1)(A),
7193 (Supp. V 1981).
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for environmental reasons to otherwise economically feasible water
power projects. The case of Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Federal
Power Commission65 is a prime example; the Commission denied a
license because an area of outstanding fishing, canoeing, and scenic
attraction was threatened."
Standing for actions under the Federal Power Act is not as auto-
matic as under citizen suit provisions of the more modern federal
environmental laws. Review of agency decisions under the Act is
restricted to an "aggrieved party. ' 67 However, this term was held,
in the landmark environmental case Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission,"5 to be sufficiently
broad, given the Commission's comprehensive public interest man-
date, to grant standing to environmental groups who participated
meaningfully in the administrative process that led to the licensing
of a pumped storage project. The Second Circuit, in Scenic Hud-
son 1,'9 remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to
consider alternatives to the proposed action with less significant
effects on the river, particularly examining impacts on an anadro-
mous striped bass fishery. °
Upon remand, the Federal Power Commission held extensive
hearings and substantially modified the project. The power house
was to be placed completely underground and transmission lines in
the scenic river valley were to be placed underwater or under-
ground. Fish protective devices were to be installed and a fish
hatchery to be built. A riverfront park was to be substituted for
the originally proposed visitors center. The Federal Power Com-
mission's approval of this modified project was subsequently chal-
lenged in Scenic Hudson II.71 In this latter case, the Court found
the mitigation plan satisfactory and denied the petitioners' claims
of the need for a broader scope of review on matters of environ-
mental policy, distinguishing the "searching and careful" scrutiny
given to environmental matters in the Supreme Court's decision in
65. 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954).
66. Id.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1982).
68. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
69. The Second Circuit's decision is known as Scenic Hudson I because of a companion
case on the same project five years later. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) (Scenic Hudson II).
70. Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d at 624-25. Anadromous fish are marine species which mi-
grate in fresh water rivers to spawn. M. LANDY, supra note 5, at 272.
71. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 18:485
STREAM FLOW MAINTENANCE
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 2
Ironically, for reasons unrelated to the litigation, the pump stor-
age project at issue in Scenic Hudson 11 was never built. However,
the environmental groups involved established standing and won
important concessions. Through these decisions the modern envi-
ronmental movement gained its first major legal triumph.
Neither Namekagon Hydro Co. nor Scenic Hudson I relied on
any federal statutory law other than the Federal Power Act. Most
subsequent cases, however, have. In Udall v. Federal Power Com-
mission73 the Supreme Court combined the Federal Power Com-
mission's "recreational purposes" mandate with the Secretary of
the Interior's mandate under the Anadromous Fish Act 74 and the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,7 5 and remanded the decision
of the Federal Power Commission to license a dam project on the
Snake River in Washington. The Commission was ordered to give
additional consideration to environmental factors, particularly the
passage by dams of anadromous Chinook salmon migrating up-
river.76
The application of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)77 was considered by the Second Circuit in Scenic
Hudson 11.78 The court found that the procedural measures man-
dated by NEPA were met by the extensive hearing process and
subsequent modification of the project.7 9 The case of Greene
County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commissions° also ad-
dressed the application of NEPA to part of a Federal Power Com-
72. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), cited in Scenic Hudson II, 453 F.2d at 468.
To read these cases as sanctioning a new standard of judicial review on matters of
environmental policy is to misconstrue both the holdings in these cases and the na-
ture of our remand in Scenic Hudson. An element common to all these cases was the
failure of an agency or other governmental authority to give adequate consideration
to the environmental factors in the situations with which they were presented.
Scenic Hudson II, 453 F.2d at 468.
73. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-757f (1982). For a discussion of this Act, see infra notes 149-54 and
accompanying text.
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668ee (1982). For a discussion of this Act, see infra notes 134-48 and
accompanying text.
76. Udall, 387 U.S. at 442 n.10, 450.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of NEPA, see supra
notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
78. 453 F.2d at 481.
79. Id.
80. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
1984] 499
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
mission license decision for a pumped storage facility.81 Petitioners
in Greene County, however, were contesting approval of a trans-
mission line associated with the project, so considerations of envi-
ronmental impacts of the dam project itself were not considered.
None of these cases related directly to the maintenance of
stream flows. Had that issue specifically arisen, however, it could
have been addressed in an affirmative manner in accordance with
the Federal Power Act's section 10(a) mandate. In California v.
Federal Power Commission,2 the court did consider the issue of
stream flow maintenance for salmon runs on California's
Tuolumne River. The Tuolumne in its natural state is character-
ized by a high flow from March to June, when the area has about
ninety percent of its annual rainfall, which averages only twelve
inches. At other times of the year, there is very little flow in the
river.8 Because of this variable flow and the presence of salmon in
the Tuolumne, the Federal Power Commission's license for the
project provided that for the first twenty years of the project's op-
eration, minimum stream flows must be maintained in the river
during the spawning season for fish run purposes. 4 Provision for
different minimum flows in "normal" and "dry" years was pro-
vided. 5 The minimum flows were to be reconsidered after twenty
years of operations.8 6
Petitioners contended that the flow restrictions impaired irriga-
tion rights acquired under California law, which the Federal Power
Commission lacked authority to do.s7 The court disagreed, holding
that the Federal Power Commission did have the authority to re-
strict irrigation rights, reasoning that section 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act required the Commission to consider all beneficial uses
including recreational uses.8 The petitioners further challenged
the Commission's actions in adopting its own "inflow" formula for
determining minimum flow, rather than the "natural flow" formula
recommended by California, even though the Commission's analy-
81. The Greene County project involved a dam on the river for a lower storage reservoir,
unlike the situation in the Scenic Hudson cases, where river flows were higher and no lower
reservoir was needed. Id.
82. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
83. Id. at 919-20.
84. Id. at 921.
85. Id. at 921-22.
86. Id. at 922.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 923.
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sis showed California's figures to be reasonable.8 9 The court upheld
the Commission's figures, holding that the Commission had ade-
quately supported the low flow requirements by specific findings,
supported by substantial evidence, relating to what average size
salmon run should be protected, the number of spawning fish re-
quired for such a run, and the area of spawning gravel required for
these spawning salmon.90 The court additionally held that the
twenty year reconsideration requirement was flexible enough to ob-
viate, at least temporarily, the need to consider other mitigative
measures, such as fish ladders and hatcheries, which might be nec-
essary if the minimum flows could not be maintained.91
C. Endangered Species Act
In 1973, Congress attempted to provide a means to protect en-
dangered and threatened species of animals and plants and their
habitats through the adoption of the Endangered Species Act.9 2 In
particular, section 7 of this Act requires all federal agencies to "in-
sure that any action authorized, funded or carried out. . . is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered spe-
cies or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species . . . unless . . . granted an
exemption. '' 93 The rigorous exemption procedure, when triggered,
involves the determination that no reasonable and prudent alter-
native to the project exists, that benefits clearly outweigh damages
to the species or habitats, that the action is of regional or national
significance, and that reasonable mitigation and enhancement
measures will be taken.94
Under section 7, project abandonment or modification is often
required to avoid the proscribed damage to species and habitat.
This law has been a potent vehicle for stopping or delaying
projects that threatened critical habitat of species on the Depart-
ment of the Interior's Endangered or Threatened Species List.95
In the leading case under the Act, Tennessee Valley Authority
89. Id. at 925-26.
90. Id. at 926.
91. Id. at 928-29. A different result might be obtained at the present time, given NEPA's
influence on the consideration of alternatives at the outset of a project.
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
93. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
94. Id. § 1536(h).
95. See id. § 1533.
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v. Hill,96 plaintiffs challenged the congressional authorization of a
dam and impoundment on the Little Tennessee River, because the
impoundment would eliminate virtually all of the known habitat of
the snail darter, a fish on the Endangered or Threatened Species
List. Plaintiffs claimed that completion of the Tellico Dam would
jeopardize the continued existence of the snail darter because of
the impoundment's alteration of flow and other habitat
conditions.9 7
The district court refused to enjoin completion of the project,
noting that Congress, though fully aware of the snail darter prob-
lem, had continued the project's appropriations. The court held
that at "some point in time a federal project becomes so near com-
pletion and so incapable of modification that a court of equity
should not apply a statute enacted long after inception of the pro-
ject to produce an unreasonable result."98 The court of appeals re-
versed and remanded. 99
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the language of section
7 is plain and makes no exception for projects well under way
when the Endangered Species Act was passed.10 The Court found
it clear from the Act's legislative history that Congress intended
"to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever
the cost" 101 and that the limited "hardship exemptions" in the Act
did not apply in this case. 02 Continued congressional appropria-
tions to the project were not determinative; such a holding would
violate the cardinal rule that repeals by implication are never fa-
vored. 103 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill thus firmly estab-
lished the primacy of protection of endangered species and species
habitat until the species is no longer classified as endangered or
threatened.0 4 Congress, however, overturned the specific protec-
tion given by the case to the snail darter by exempting the Tellico
Dam from the Endangered Species Act. 0 5 The project, which had
96. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d
1064 (6th Cir. 1977), a/I'd, 437 U.S. 154 (1978).
97. 419 F. Supp. at 756.
98. Id. at 760.
99. 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
100. 437 U.S. at 173.
101. Id. at 184.
102. Id. at 188.
103. Id. at 189-91.
104. Id.; see also Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
105. Pub. L. No. 96-69, tit. IV, 93 Stat. 449-50 (1979).
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been seventy to eighty percent complete when the litigation was
initiated, has now been completed.
Earlier Endangered Species Act cases did not arrive at such ex-
treme results. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,106 plaintiffs sued to en-
join construction of a dam that would have flooded some but not
all of the caves where an endangered species, the Indiana Cave
Bat, lived. The court of appeals denied relief.10 7 Likewise, in Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. Coleman,08 the court noted that con-
struction of a highway that would destroy only a tiny part of the
critical habitat of the Sandhill Crane was permissible if it would
not jeopardize the existence of the species.
The 1982 case of Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v.
Watt'0 9 illustrates how the Endangered Species Act can be used to
protect aquatic base flows. The case involved water releases from a
dam in California into a river flowing into Pyramid Lake in Ne-
vada, the habitat of the native species Lahontan cutthroat trout
and the cui-ui fish, an endangered species whose sole habitat is
Pyramid Lake.1 0 The court held that the Secretary of the Interior
was "required to give the Pyramid Lake fishery priority over all
other purposes of [the Dam] until the cui-ui and the Lahontan cut-
throat trout are no longer classified as endangered or
threatened.""'
Another case, United States v. Cappaert,"2 suggests that not
only surface water allocation, but also groundwater allocation
could be affected by the priority afforded endangered species. Cap-
paert did not raise the issue of the Endangered Species Act di-
rectly, but held that when the United States reserved an under-
ground lake as a national monument, it acquired, by reservation,
water rights to the underground water sufficient to maintain the
level of the lake and preserve a rare species of fish." 3
106. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
107. Id., aff'g 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
108. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
429 U.S. 979 (1976).
109. 549 F. Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982).
110. Id. at 706.
111. Id. at 710.
112. 426 U.S. 128 (1976), aff'g 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
113. 426 U.S. at 141-47.
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D. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,114 adopted in 1968, established
a national system of free flowing rivers 15 and instituted procedures
for the inclusion of additional qualifying rivers by either Congress
or the states. 16 Streams or stream segments fall into one of three
classifications under the system, depending on the degree of modi"
fication of the stream from its free flowing state: (1) Wild river
areas, free from impoundments and generally inaccessible except
by trail, (2) Scenic river areas, free from impoundments, largely
undeveloped but accessible in places by road, and (3) Recreational
river areas, readily accessible, some development, and some im-
poundment or diversion in the past.117
Virginia has no rivers included in any of the three classifications
of the federal system, nor are there any studies presently in pro-
gress to recommend for inclusion any Virginia stream segments.
However, Virginia has established a system of state scenic rivers.18
Inclusion of a river in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Sys-
tem restricts the uses to which it may be put. The requirement
that rivers in the system "shall be preserved in free flowing condi-
tion, and that they and their immediate environments shall be pro-
tected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future genera-
tions" , proscribes impoundments within the system and strongly
implies flow requirements for non-system upstream segments. This
implication is supported by the specific requirement that project
works authorized under the Federal Power Act cannot be on or
directly adversely affect rivers already in the system. 20 On the
other hand, a department or agency of the United States, if it com-
plies with certain procedural requirements, may recommend a
water resources project that would have a direct and adverse effect
114. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982).
115. Id. § 1274. For interesting background on the origins of this preservation-oriented
law, which arose out of the multiple use concept of natural resource management developed
under President Theodore Roosevelt (particularly as a reaction to the large-scale water de-
velopment projects that ultimately ensued), see Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1970).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1275 (1982).
117. Id. § 1273(b).
118. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-167 to -175 (Repl. Vol. 1978). See infra notes 289-96 and ac-
companying text.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
120. Id. § 1278(a).
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on the values for which such a river was established. 121
However, before any of the foregoing protections afforded by the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act can be effected, a river must have
achieved designed status under the Act. In North Carolina v. Fed-
eral Power Commission, 22 petitioners sought to protect a segment
of the New River in North Carolina from FPC licensing 23 of a dam
in Virginia. The proposed dam would have caused inundation of
this segment of the New River in North Carolina being considered
for inclusion in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System. Petitioners
contended that section 7(b) of the Act 24 prohibited the Federal
Power commission from licensing the dam project. 25 The court
disagreed, however, and held that such protection was available
only for rivers already achieving designed status under section 7(a)
of the Act. 2
6
The protection offered to river segments already in the system or
nominated for study for inclusion in section 7(a) of the Act is by
no means absolute. In Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission,127 the approval of a proposed
modification to a dam on the Skagit River in Washington was al-
leged to be in conflict with section 7(b) of the Act because it would
affect a section of the river approximately eleven miles below the
dam that was designated in section 5(a) of the Act for potential
addition to the system. This case is particularly germane to this
article because at issue was the question of flow requirements
needed to preclude diminishment of downstream fish and wildlife
121. Id. The agency or department must, however, notify in writing the Secretary of the
Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture sixty days in advance, and must report to Congress
in writing relating to the conflict between such project and the values of the Act.
122. 533 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 891 (1976).
123. See supra notes 60-91 and accompanying text.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1278(b) (1982).
125. 533 F.2d at 708.
126. Id. at 708-09. Section 7(a) of the Act is found at 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a) (1982). North
Carolina v. Federal Power Comm'n was decided by the district court on March 24, 1976. On
September 11 of that year, 16 U.S.C. § 1278 was amended by Public Law 94-407 to include a
26.5 mile segment of the New River in North Carolina ending at the Virginia State Line.
The amendment specifically precluded any FPC project that would "inundate or otherwise
adversely affect" the river segment. Pub. L. No. 94-407, 90 Stat. 1238 (1976). The Appalach-
ian Power Company contended that the congressional action amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking. The U.S. Court of Claims held that the congressional action, taken during the
pendancy of Federal Power Commission proceedings on the company's dam project did not
amount to a taking, since the FPC license granting the right to build the project was still
subject to judicial review. Appalachian Power Co. v. United States, 607 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl.
1979).
127. 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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values. Here petitioners and intervenors did not question the suffi-
ciency of the agency record but focused on legal arguments relating
to section 7 of the Act.12 8
The court found that proper consideration had been given to the
requirements of section 7 of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, even
though the downstream flow requirements had not been specifi-
cally addressed in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pro-
ceedings themselves, because the Departments of Interior and Ag-
riculture had elected to address them in separate proceedings. 129 In
upholding the dgency decisions, the court noted Vermont Yan-
kee,'130 and held that "administrative agencies should be free to
fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of in-
quiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous
duties."'' 31
In a strongly worded dissent to the deference of the court to the
agencies' "piecemealing" of the important issues surrounding the
case, Judge Wald observed that "[a]ll of the legally critical issues
pertaining to High Ross [dam modification] could have and should
have been decided in one proceeding, and it is management fault
and a statutory lapse that they were not.' 3 2 The dissent went on
to cite numerous references in the record to detrimental down-
stream effects due to changes in flow regime as well as to unan-
swered questions relating to these changes.'33 The dissent, proba-
bly the better reasoned holding in this situation, underscores the
need for interest groups not only to participate in the development
of the administrative record but also to forcefully bring the record
to a reviewing court's attention.
E. Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA),1 4 was enacted
in 1958 "to provide that wildlife conservation shall receive equal
consideration and be coordinated with other features of water-re-
source development programs" through "protection. . .of all spe-
cies of wildlife, resources thereof, and their habitat. 1" 5 The Act is
128. Id. at 521 n.7.
129. Id. at 507-10.
130. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
131. Swinomish Tribal Community, 627 F.2d at 510.
132. Id. at 518 (Wald, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 521-25.
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666(c) (1982).
135. Id. § 661.
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potentially important for assuring maintenance of instream aquatic
base flow, as it requires that when any federal agency, or public or
private agency under a federal permit or license, proposes or au-
thorizes impounding, diverting or controlling waters, that agency
shall consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service "with a view
to the conservation of wildlife resources by preventing loss of and
damage to such resources as well as providing for the development
and improvement thereof in connection with such water resource
development.' 1 36 Impoundments with surface areas of less than ten
acres and "land management and use carried out by federal agen-
cies with respect to federal lands under their jurisdiction[s]," are
exempted under this Act from the foregoing provisions.'37
In practice, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act has not
achieved its potential. The emphasis of agencies consulting with
the Fish and Wildlife Service has not been upon protecting and
augmenting resources but rather upon limiting losses, and even
this aim has been poorly achieved. 38 The cases that interpret the
provision for equal consideration for wildlife conservation in this
Act attach to it little, if any, substantive protection. 39 Rather, it is
interpreted to mandate NEPA-like procedural requirements that,
once considered, need not necessarily affect the outcome of the
agency decision, unless ignored in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.
Issues of downstream flow maintenance often occur in impound-
ment projects, but the results have not been particularly satisfying.
Treatment of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act issue in a
Fourth Circuit case is illustrative. In Cape Henry Bird Club v.
Laird,140 a case involving the construction of the Gathright Dam
on the Jackson River in Allegheny and .Bath Counties in western
Virginia, plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of the dam claim-
ing that the Corps of Engineers had failed to sufficiently mitigate
the loss of fish and wildlife values. The court held that the Act
only required the Corps attempt to mitigate losses by consulting
with appropriate state and federal agencies, and noted that the
Corps' good faith compliance with the requirements of NEPA au-
tomatically complies with the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
136. Id. § 662(a).
137. Id. § 662(h).
138. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 826 (1977).
139. See, e.g., Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
140. 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973).
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Act. 141 It had been previously held that an agency does not have to
surpass strict NEPA compliance to satisfy the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act unless NEPA compliance allowed omission of
FWCA recommendations as an integral part of its progress reports
to Congress on projects being funded under congressional
authorization.142
The Act provides even less substantive protection for already ex-
isting impoundments where flow maintenance for aquatic habitat
and fishery protection is affected. In County of Trinity v. An-
drus,'14 for example, the court considered well-documented needs
to increase flows to improve king salmon and steelhead trout
habitat and spawning in the Trinity River in northern California
after eighty-five to ninety percent of the river's flow had been di-
verted for other purposes by the Central Valley Project of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Reclamation.
Both the California Department of Fish and Game and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service had concluded that some level of in-
creased flow would improve fish habitat in the river, and had rec-
ommended that annual flows be increased some two and a half
times the originally agreed-upon minimum release of 120,000 acre
feet per year to 315,000 acre feet per year. Most of the increase
would have been concentrated in May and June to simulate natu-
ral snow melt conditions.'4 The Bureau of Reclamation had
agreed to a compromise release of 245,000 acre feet per year and a
monitoring and evaluation study was in progress to reassess the
quantity and timing of releases necessary to restore the fishery.
45
An extended period of drought reduced the availability of water
drastically and the Bureau of Reclamation informed Trinity
County that it would return to the old minimum release of 120,000
acre feet per year.146 The County Board of Supervisors brought an
action claiming, among other things, that the Fish and Wildlife Co-
ordination Act required the Bureau of Reclamation to release suffi-
cient amounts of water to sustain fish populations in the Trinity
River. 47 The Court found this claim without merit, holding that
no private right of action arises under the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
141. Id. at 417-18; see also Akers, 339 F. Supp. at 1380.
142. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 1245, 1255 (D.D.C. 1977).
143. 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
144. Id. at 1372-73.
145. Id. at 1373.
146. Id. at 1373-74.
147. Id. at 1374.
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dination Act. 4 '
Thus, while the consultation procedure mandated by the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act can lead to coordinated planning of
water projects which takes into account instream aquatic base flow
needs, it is by no means assured that such coordinated planning
will take place. Stream flow maintenance advocates are well ad-
vised to participate actively in the inter-agency process of the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act to insure that its procedural steps
produce a clear record for agency decisionmaking.
F. Anadromous Fish Conservation Act
In 1965, Congress passed the Anadromous Fish Conservation
Act,149 and authorized funds for the conservation, development,
and enhancement of the nation's anadromous fisheries stocks. The
bill authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into coopera-
tive agreements with the states:
(1) to conduct investigations, engineering, and biological surveys,
and research, (2) to carry out stream clearance activities, (3) to con-
struct, install, maintain, and operate devices and structures for the
improvement of feeding and spawning conditions, for fisheries re-
sources protection, and for facilitating the free migration of any fish,
(4) to construct, operate, and maintain fish hatcheries, (5) to con-
duct studies and make recommendations . . . , (6) to acquire lands
.... ,(7) to accept donations of funds and to use such funds for
acquiring or managing lands, and (8) to administer such lands and
interest ... for the purposes of the act. 5'
Congress viewed the law as augmenting the Fish and Wildlife Co-
ordination Act.15
The Act, however, made no changes in existing law. 52 Thus, re-
viewing courts have followed the example of the court in County of
148. Id. at 1383. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 640 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 754 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
149. Pub. L. No. 89-304, 79 Stat. 1125 (1965) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 757(a)-
(f) (1982)). For the legislative history of this Act, see 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3837-59.
150. 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3839.
151. Id. In the Act's legislative history, Virginia was noted as having anadromous alewife,
shad, striped bass, and herring fisheries. Id. at 3842.
152. See supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
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Trinity v. Andrus,'53 where the court, after dismissing plaintiff's
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim, dismissed the plaintiff-
intervenor's Anadromous Fish Act claim noting that the latter act
provided "even less support for relief in this case, since it merely
authorizes the Secretary to enter into cooperative agreements with
the states for the conservation of anadromous fish."' 54
G. Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act of 1977
The Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act'55 was enacted
to further the conservation of soil, water, and related resources
through programs administered through the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. 56 The Act provides for a continuing appraisal of the soil,
water and related resources of the Nation, periodic updating of the
program in conjunction with the roles and program responsibilities
of other federal, state, and local agencies, and an annual evaluation
report to be presented to Congress. 57
Although the Act does not specifically mention stream flow
maintenance as a factor in the continuing appraisal of the Nation's
resources, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to consider
"data on the quality and quantity of soil, water, and related re-
sources, including fish and wildlife habitats."'58 The Secretary is
also required to "establish an integrated system capable of using
combinations of resource data to determine the quality and capa-
bilities for alternative uses of the resource base.' 1 59
The Act provides both that soil conservation practices be coordi-
nated with fish and wildlife habitat and water and related resource
protection, and that NEPA-like procedural mandates be estab-
lished in an integrated system for considering alternatives. The
"multiple use" language of the Act is, in all likelihood, too vague to
provide any judicially enforceable standards. 60 On the other hand,
the Act does provide an opportunity for administrative appraisal
at the programmatic level of all Soil Conservation Service
153. 438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
154. Id. at 1383.
155. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (1982).
156. Id. § 2003(a).
157. Id. § 2003(c).
158. Id. § 2004(a).
159. Id. § 2004(b).
160. See Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971) (dealing with the Multi-
ple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-532 (1982)).
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projects. 6' This appraisal opportunity can, perhaps, be a useful
tool in directing these projects-rather notorious for their single
purpose nature-toward a more balanced approach, including a
consideration of stream flow maintenance.
IV. CURRENT VIRGINIA STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES
The Code of Virginia and the regulations and policies of the
State Water Control Board contain no explicit aquatic base-flow
requirements. A strong case can be made, however, that they pro-
vide substantive agency authority and responsibility to ensure ade-
quate flows when the circumstances arise. Virginia has no program
in place for directly regulating the consumptive use of surface
water. However, as discussed above, the State exercises substantial
authority over federally-licensed projects under the certification
requirements contained in section 401 of the Clean Water Act 162
and there are several regulatory vehicles at the state level for im-
plementation of flow requirements.
Numerous expressions of policy contained in the Code or
adopted by the State Water Control Board establish some direc-
tion that applies-or should apply-to State agencies in carrying
out their regulatory and other functions. Furthermore, article XI
of the Virginia Constitution requires that agency actions affecting
the environment must fully weigh impacts and alternatives. 63 The
lack of criteria for implementing those policies and legislative dec-
larations has made their application spotty, however. Lack of ex-
plicit statutory requirements for consideration and protection of
aquatic base flows has given the State Water Control Board reason
to assume more discretion than it should have in light of legislative
policy and the requirements of the Virginia Constitution. More-
over, the Board's clear ability to impose minimum flow require-
ments appears to be entangled unnecessarily with the issue of
water allocation among competing users, leading to an excess of
caution. This section examines the present Code requirements and
the regulations and policies of State agencies pertaining to regula-
tion of instream flow.
161. 16 U.S.C. § 2002(2) (1982).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
163. VA. CONST. art. XI.
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A. Sources of State Authority
Determination of Virginia's authority and policies regarding
water management requires the examination of the state constitu-
tion164 and various statutes, regulations and policies, which have
been enacted or adopted over a period going back to the mid-nine-
teenth century. Most of these statutes, regulations, and policies,
however, date no further back than the end of World War II.
B. State Water Control Law
The State Water Control Law (SWCL)165 is the basic statute
governing water resource management in the Commonwealth. Al-
though it is applied primarily to the control of activities that result
or may result in the discharge of pollutants, it is not so restricted
by its own terms. An examination of the SWCL's pertinent provi-
sions supports the interpretation that the State Water Control
Board's responsibilities extend equally to activities that may affect
stream carrying capacity. The SWCL begins with a statement de-
claring it to be the policy of the Commonwealth-and the purpose
of the law-to:
(1) protect existing high quality state waters and restore all other
state waters to such condition of qtfality that any such waters will
permit all reasonable public uses and will support the propagation
and growth of all aquatic life . . . which might reasonably be ex-
pected to inhabit them, (2) safeguard the clean waters . . . from
pollution, (3) prevent any increase in pollution, (4) reduce existing
pollution, and (5) pronmote water resource conservation, manage-
ment and distribution, and encourage water consumption reduction
. . . for the health, safety and welfare of the present and future citi-
zens of the Commonwealth. 166
The SWCL defines "state waters" to include all water, on the
surface and under the ground, whether wholly or partially within
the state's jurisdiction. 67 "Pollution" is defined, significantly, as:
such alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of
any state waters (a) as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render
164. Id.
165. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.37:1 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
166. Id. § 62.1-44.2.
167. Id. § 62.1-44.3(4).
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such waters harmful or detrimental or injurious to the public health,
safety or welfare, or the health of animals, fish or aquatic life;
(b) unsuitable with reasonable treatment for use as . . . [a] public
water supply; or (c) unsuitable for recreational, commercial, indus-
trial, agricultural or other reasonable uses .... "s
The SWCL further defines "pollution" as any alteration of the
property of state waters or any discharge of wastes into state wa-
ters which by itself is not sufficient to cause pollution but which, in
combination with alteration or discharge by other owners, is suffi-
cient to cause pollution, and which contributes to the contraven-
tion of water quality standards adopted by the Board.1 69 The defi-
nition of "pollution" in the SWCL is thus sufficiently broad to
encompass any activities that would alter or affect water quali-
ty-including impoundment, withdrawal and other changes in
stream flow.
1. State Control; Public Policy
Section 62.1-44.4(1) of the SWCL reserves and affirms "[t]he
right and control of the State in and over all state waters" and
denies any prescriptive right to denigrate water quality by past or
future discharge of wastes or other actions by any owner. 170 Section
62.1-44.5 of the law declares it to be against public policy for any
owner to discharge wastes or to alter the properties of state waters
and make them detrimental to public health, animal or aquatic
life, or to use for domestic, industrial, recreational or "other uses,"
unless the owner obtains a certificate from the Board.' 7 '
2. State Water Control Board; Powers and Duties
The State Water Control Law and certain other water manage-
•ment programs are administered by the State Water Control
Board, a seven-member citizen panel appointed by the Governor.
A staff of about 350 persons, distributed among the headquarters
office in Richmond and six regional offices, performs the technical,
administrative and clerical functions of the agency. The staff is
168. Id. § 62.1-44.3(6).
169. Id. The definition refers to both the alteration of the properties of state waters and
the discharge of wastes to state waters. Thus, the alteration of properties encompassed by
the definition of "pollution" must include activities other than the discharge of pollutants.
170. Id. § 62.1-44.4(1).
171. Id. § 62.1-44.5.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
headed by an Executive Director, who is also a gubernatorial ap-
pointee. The Board is empowered to delegate all but a few of its
functions to the Executive Director, but in practice the Board has
maintained an active role in both setting and implementing its
policies. 17 2
The Board's authority over water quality management is virtu-
ally unrestricted under the SWCL. Section 62.1-44.15(1), for exam-
ple, declares it to be the duty and power of the Board "to exercise
general supervision and control over the quality, management and
distribution of all state waters and to administer and enforce [the
SWCL], and all certificates, standards, policies, rules, regulations,
rulings and special orders promulgated thereunder.' 17 3 Succeeding
subsections prescribe the duty and authority of the Board to estab-
lish standards of quality and policies for state waters and to take
all appropriate steps to prevent quality alteration "contrary to the
public interest,"1 4 to conduct studies, investigations and research
on carrying out the purposes of the SWCL, 75 to issue certificates
for the discharge of wastes into or "the alteration otherwise of the
physical, chemical or biological properties of state waters,"' 6 to
enforce its policies and programs and to adopt regulations it deems
necessary to enforce its general water quality management pro-
gram. 177 Remaining sections of the SWCL deal with discharge per-
mit requirements, 178 enforcement,17 9 procedures for decisionmak-
ing, 80 judicial review,18  penalties and recovery for oil spill
damages and costs."8 2
Sections 62.1-44.2 to -44.15 are the "heart" of the SWCL in that
they prescribe the Board's powers and duties and establish the pol-
icy background against which these powers and duties are to be
administered. 183 While there is no explicit mention of instream
flow anywhere in the SWCL, it seems evident that the law empow-
ers the Board to establish and impose-by certification-instream
172. Id. §§ 62.1-44.7 to -44.15.
173. Id. § 62.1-44.15(1).
174. Id. § 62.1-44.15(3)(a).
175. Id. § 62.1-44.15(4).
176. Id. § 62.1-44.15(5).
177. Id. § 62.1-44.15(6), (10).
178. Id. §§ 62.1-44.18 to -44.19.2.
179. Id. §§ 62.1-44.20 to -44.30.
180. Id. §§ 62.1-44.24 to -44.28.
181. Id. § 62.1-44.29.
182. Id. §§ 62.1-44.32, -44.34:2, -44.34:7.
183. Id. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.15.
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flow maintenance requirements to be met by persons whose activi-
ties may affect water quality.8 4
The extent of the Board's duty in this regard is less obvious. The
broad definition of pollution, coupled with the statutory statement
of public policy requiring certification for activities that alter the
characteristics of state waters, strongly implies that some form of
Board approval is required for activities that materially affect
stream flow. These considerations are usually addressed where an
existing certification program is in place, although the adequacy of
protection is questionable. With regard to water withdrawals, how-
ever, this generalization seems to run head-on into other long-
standing policies. With one narrow exception,'85 the legislature has
so far avoided the adoption of any program or requirement re-
specting water allocation or requiring permits for water with-
drawal. The assumption that this precludes the Board from con-
trolling consumptive uses to the extent that they conflict with the
public interest in environmental protection is, however,
unwarranted.
The Board is charged in a separate chapter with the develop-
ment of "a coordinated policy for the use and control of all the
water resources of the State,"'8 " which must foster and encourage,
among other thing, "[t]he maintenance of stream flows sufficient to
support aquatic life and to minimize pollution."'' 17
The Board is also required to prepare plans and programs for
water resource management in all major river basins of the state,
"to encourage, promote and secure the maximum beneficial use
and control thereof."'8 8 In preparing these plans, the Board is re-
quired to:
estimate, for each major river and stream, the minimum instream
flows necessary during drought conditions to maintain water quality
and avoid permanent damage to aquatic life in streams, bays and
estuaries, [and to] . . .evaluate, to the extent practicable, the abil-
ity of existing subsurface and surface waters to meet current and
future water uses, including minimum instream flows, during
drought conditions.'89
184. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
185. Groundwater Act of 1973, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.83 to -44.107 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
186. Id. § 62.1-44.36.
187. Id. § 62.1-44.36(5).
188. Id. § 62.1-44.38(A).
189. Id. § 62.1-44.38(B).
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In order to compile sufficient information to carry out these re-
sponsibilities, the Board is authorized to require water users whose
average withdrawals exceed 10,000 gallons per day in any month to
register and submit certain use data.190 The Board has recently
promulgated regulations to that effect.'9 '
The legislative policy set forth at the end of this chapter of the
SWCL, however, appears to restrict the Board's ability to imple-
ment its findings. The chapter is not to be construed "as altering,
or as authorizing any alteration of, any existing riparian rights or
other vested rights in water or water use."''
Similar legislative sentiments are found in yet another chapter
of title 62.1-"State Policy as to Waters."'193 The chapter defines
"water" in terms identical to the definition of state waters in the
SWCL19 4 and "beneficial use" as "domestic, agricultural, recrea-
tional and commercial and industrial uses.' 95 The "State Policy"
chapter declares all waters to be "a natural resource which should
be regulated by the State" and provides, in part, that:
(b) The regulation, control, development and use of waters for all
purposes beneficial to the public are within the jurisdiction of the
State which in the exercise of its police powers may establish mea-
sures to effectuate the proper and comprehensive utilization and
protection of such waters.
(c) The changing wants and needs of the people of the State may
require [its] water resources ... to be put to uses beneficial to the
public ....
(d) The public welfare and interest of the people of the State re-
quire the proper development, wise use, conservation and protection
of water resources ....
(e) The right to the use of water or to the flow of water in or from
any natural ... watercourse in this State is and shall be limited to
such water as may reasonably be required for the beneficial use of
190. Id. § 62.1-44.38(C). Crop irrigation is exempted from this requirement. Id.
191. SWCB Reg. No. 11 (effective March 1, 1982).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.44(b) (Repl. Vol. 1982) (emphasis added).
193. Id. §§ 62.1-10 to .1-13.6 (Repl. Vol. 1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
194. Id. § 62.1-10(a) (Rep. Vol. 1982).
195. Id. § 62.1-10(b). There is no mention of aquatic life or habitat protection, although
recreational and commercial uses might be construed to incorporate protection of at least
those species of commercial or recreational significance.
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the public to be served; such right shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of such water."9 8
The clarity of this statement of purpose is somewhat clouded,
however, by the closing disclaimer:
Nothing in this chapter shall operate or affect any existing valid use
of such waters or interfere with such uses hereafter acquired, nor
shall it be construed as applying to the determination of rights in
any proceeding now pending or hereafter instituted. 197
Thus, the SWCL and supporting policies can readily be con-
strued as requiring Board approval for consumptive uses, im-
poundment and other activities affecting stream characteristics. It
is not limited solely to the discharge of pollutants. Furthermore,
certification is not a mere formality; it must be conditioned suffi-
ciently to protect all beneficial uses including public health,
aquatic life and habitat, domestic, agricultural and industrial water
supply and recreation.""
Statements of policy in the SWCL itself, in the "State Policy as
to Waters," and in the water policy planning provisions of the Vir-
ginia Code evince legislative intent to protect a wide range of val-
ues, including those dependent upon sufficient flow maintenance,
and to ensure compatibility among consumptive and non-con-
sumptive uses. The disclaimers denying any intent to assume a
regulatory role over water allocation or supply management have
possibly been misconstrued as vitiating this comprehensive author-
ity. There is no question that control over allocation is not legisla-
tively favored. Legislative efforts to enact a system whereby the
State Water Control Board or some other state agency would allo-
cate supply have been uniformly rejected. 199
It may appear at first glance that water policies expressed at var-
ious times in the Code are mutually contradictory, and that the
legislative disclaimers effectively eviscerate the clear and desirable
196. Id. § 62.1-11 (emphasis added).
197. Id. § 62.1-12.
198. Id. § 62.1-44.5.
199. See, e.g., the proposed Water Code of Virginia, VIRGINIA WATER RESOURCES RE-
SEARCH CENTER, A WATER CODE FOR VIRGINIA (1980). The proposed water law, which would
have instituted a permit system for ground and surface water allocation, was introduced in
the 1981 General Assembly, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem. § 62.2-40, but was defeated in
committee. 1981 VA. HousE JOURNAL 1290.
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policies for water quality protection. Upon closer scrutiny, how-
ever, the conflict does not appear to be so evident. There is no
necessary contradiction between the legislative reaffirmation of the
existing common law system of allocation and the declaration of a
public interest sufficient to invoke the police power to ensure water
quality protection.
A regulatory program requiring certification for water with-
drawal, imposing conditions sufficient to protect beneficial uses de-
termined to be in the public interest, would not be incompatible
with the legislative intent to preserve riparian property rights ex-
pressed in the Virginia Code.20 0 After all, the fundamental purpose
of the police power is to permit the orderly coexistence of private
rights and the public welfare. Controls on water use to achieve the
purposes set forth in the Code would not involve the Board in the
determination of rights among competing private Claimants, but
would merely provide for the imposition of limitations, deemed to
be in the public interst, on the exercise of private property rights.
There is no functional difference between a permit requirement for
withdrawal and a permit requirement for the discharge of pollu-
tants, where the purpose of the requirements is to protect the
quality of the resource. Waste disposal is traditionally as much an
incident of riparian ownership as other uses are, yet there has been
no hesitation to impose limitations and certification requirements
on that class of activity. 10' Thus, it is submitted, there is no irrec-
oncilable conflict in the coexistent legislative policies to protect
beneficial uses of state waters and to preserve existing property
rights.
Nonetheless, the State Water Control Board has traditionally
200. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-12, -44.44 (Repl. Vol. 1982). See also id. §§ 62.1-44.83 to
-44.107 (an example of police power control over a surface owner's right to use
groundwater).
201. See, e.g., the Clean Water Act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), requiring permits of all dischargers of industrial waste. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
1342 (1982). The permit program is administered in Virginia by the SWCB. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 62.1-15(5) (Repl. Vol. 1982); SWCB Reg. No. 6 (1981). Under the riparian ownership con-
cept, an owner can use a stream for waste disposal as long as his use does not materially
impair other riparian owners from enjoying their rights. The test for acceptable riparian use
focuses on the effect such use has on other riparian owners. Cf. Panther Coal Co. v. Looney,
185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946); Arminius Chem. Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459
(1912). The actual discharge of waste, however, is more directly governed today by statute.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.4 (Repl. Vol. 1982). Thus, waste disposal in a stream may
violate state law without intruding upon the rights of other riparian owners. Conversely,
possession of a discharge permit is not a defense to an action by another riparian owner.
SWCB Reg. No. 6.19(d).
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steered clear of imposing state certification requirements or re-
strictions on consumptive uses of surface waters. Given the highly
sensitive nature of real or perceived encroachments on the riparian
system in Virginia, this is clearly a case in which discretion has
been the better part of valor. The statutory policies protecting in-
stream flow are primarily implemented in those cases where there
is an already-existing regulatory "peg"-such as a permit require-
ment-under state or federal law, to which flow conditions can be
attached.
C. Other Virginia Statutes
Several other state laws impose permit and regulatory require-
ments on activities which substantively affect state waters. Most of
these requirements rely upon the recommendations of the SWCB
for water quality requirements, and all state agencies are bound by
the requirements of article XI of the Virginia Constitution.20
Thus, the fundamental policies expressed in the SWCL are appli-
cable to those agencies, even where the SWCB is not the licensing
authority.
1. State Ownership of Submerged Lands
One of the earliest, still-extant enactments concerning public
rights to Virginia waters can be found in chapter 1 of the SWCL,
which declares the beds of all bays, rivers, and creeks and the sea-
shores of the State, to the low water mark (that were not previ-
ously conveyed by grant or compact) are the property of the Com-
monwealth to "be used as a common by all the people of the State,
for the purpose of fishing and fowling, and of taking and catching
oysters and other shellfish."20 3 This section is merely declarative of
the common law "public trust doctrine" and creates no new prop-
erty right in the Commonwealth. 04 At common law, the state holds
all submerged lands in public trust, subject to certain public rights
such as navigation and fishery. 0 5 Conveyances or uses of such
lands must be accomplished without substantial impairment of the
public's rights. 0 6 The scope and extent of lands and uses protected
202. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
203. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-1 to -2 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
204. Meredith v. Triple Island Gunning Club, 113 Va. 80, 84, 73 S.E. 721, 723 (1912).
205. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
206. Id.
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by the public trust may vary from state to state,0 7 but as one com-
mentator has stated, "[a]t a minimum the public trust doctrine re-
quires a state to assume some responsibility for resource manage-
ment on behalf of the public. 2
s0 8
The narrowest application of the trust classifies use of waters for
navigation and commerce as public rights that must be protected.
Other uses, such as fishery and recreation, may not enjoy such pro-
tection, and may be alienated to a private use or subordinated to
another public use that has been deemed superior. In Virginia, for
example, the Supreme Court has classified navigation as an "inher-
ent and inseparable incident" of sovereignty and therefore inalien-
able insofar as public rights, or jus publicum, would be improved,
while uses classified as jus privatum, such as fishery, may be con-
veyed or destroyed by a legislative decision to give preference to a
competing public use.209
The exercise of the Commonwealth's preeminent authority over
submerged lands is accomplished by section 62.1-3 of the Code,
which declares it unlawful to "build, dump, or otherwise trespass
upon or over or encroach upon or take or use any materials" from
submerged lands that are the property of the Commonwealth with-
out statutory authority or a permit from the Marine Resources
Commission (MRC).2 10 The section grants statutory authority for a
number of activities, including the erection of dams "authorized by
proper authority. '21 ' The MRC is authorized to issue permits "for
all other reasonable uses of state-owned bottomlands," including
the taking of material, constructing of bulkheads and wharves, and
dredging and filling. 212
In granting or denying a bottomland permit, the MRC is to be
"guided in its deliberations" by article XI, section 1 of the Virginia
Constitution,213 and must "consider, among other things" the effect
of the project on "other reasonable and permissible uses of state
waters and. . . bottomlands, its effect on the marine and fisheries
207. See Berryhill & Williams, Taking Precedents in the Tidelands: Refocusing on Emi-
nent Domain, 18 U. RIcH. L. REV. 453, 465 n.62 (1984).
208. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern Relevance, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 884 (1982).
209. Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 552, 164 S.E. 689, 698-99
(1932).
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. VA. CONST. art. XI. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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resources of the Commonwealth," wetlands, and the project's pub-
lic and private benefits.114 The Commission is also required to give
"due consideration" to the water quality standards established by
the State Water Control Board.215
This section has limited use as an affirmative means of regulat-
ing instream flow. State ownership is restricted, with few excep-
tions, to the beds of navigable and tidal waters;21 6 the beds of non-
navigable streams belong in most cases to the respective riparian
owners. Whatever rights the public may have in the waters overly-
ing privately-owned stream bottoms (e.g., commercial navigation)
are unaffected by the MRC, whose regulatory jurisdiction extends
only to subaqueous land owned by the state. Furthermore, excep-
tions in the statute for dams, congressionally-approved navigation
and flood control projects exclude from MRC's permitting require-
ments major classes of projects with significant effects on instream
flow. 17 Nonetheless, the statutory criteria that MRC must follow
in granting or denying permits218 are sufficiently broad to require
at least the consideration of instream flow factors in those cases
where an MRC permit is required.
2. Surface and Floodwater Impoundment
Virginia's common law system of allocation has been somewhat
modified with respect to certain uses of impounded floodwaters,
where the surface water flow is in excess of "normal." Chapter 8 of
the SWCL, "Impoundment of Surface Waters," allows the capture
of diffused surface waters in accordance with the common law rule,
and declares such waters when impounded to be the property of
the impounding owner.21 '9 Thus, there is no attempt to regulate de-
flection of runoff which might otherwise augment flow in streams
or recharge aquifers. The statute goes further, however, and allows
riparian owners, upon approval of the local circuit court, to capture
and store "water in watercourses which is over and above the aver-
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
215. Id.
216. Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
217. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (RepI. Vol. 1982).
218. Id.
219. Id. §§ 62.1-104 to -115. At common law, "surface water" is defined as that which
results from rainfall or melting snow and is diffused across the ground. Upon entering a
natural stream or watercourse, it is no longer surface water. A landowner may divert or
obstruct surface water as long as other property is not unreasonably damaged or impaired
thereby. See Note, Surface Water Law in Virginia, 44 VA. L. REv. 135 (1958).
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age flow of the stream. '220 This may be accomplished under several
statutory conditions, the most important that "there be no damage
to others,"'221 that the flow below the impoundment be maintained
at a specified level,2 2 that priority to state floodwaters goes to up-
stream owners, and that the impoundment conform to "rules
and regulations promulgated" by the SWCB.224
In addition, the SWCB must review the impounding owner's pe-
tition and advise the circuit court concerning the average flow of
the stream, potential conflicts with other development in the wa-
tershed, the effect of the impoundment on pollution abatement,
and any other relevant matters the Board desires to raise. 25 The
court must deny the petition if it determines that other riparian
owners will be injured or that there are "other justifiable reasons"
for denial. Furthermore, the petition may not be granted in any
case where the SWCB has certified that "the reduction of pollution
will be impaired or made more difficult. '226 If the court grants the
petition, it is required to "place the applicant under such terms
and conditions as shall seem to it right.M22 7
Any owner whose petition is granted pursuant to the chapter is
entitled to "sole and unrestricted use" of the stored floodwaters for
the purpose authorized.28 The owner is also granted statutory per-
mission to use the bed of the watercourse if title is in the
Commonwealth. 29
At first glance this statute may appear to provide substantial
private authority to appropriate waters that exceed "average"
stream flow (whatever that may be), restricting the rights of down-
220. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-106 to -107 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
221. Id. § 62.1-106(1).
222. Id. § 62.1-106(5). The flow level below the impoundment must be at least equal to
that above the impoundment when the above-impoundment flow is less than or equal to the
stream's average flow, or must be equal to the average stream flow when the above-im-
poundment flow exceeds that average flow.
223. Id. § 62.1-106(9). Presumably, the right of location takes precedence over temporal
right, although this is uncertain in view of the requirement that no one else be damaged.
224. Id. § 62.1-106(11). It is not clear whether this refers only to the SWCB's surface
impoundment regulations, which are primarily structural (SWCB Reg. No. 9, (1979)) or to
water quality requirements as well.
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-109 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
226. Id. § 62.1-111. Given the broad definition of "pollution" under § 62.1-44.3(6), the
SWCB has wide latitude here.
227. Id. § 62.1-111.
228. Id. § 62.1-115. This means, presumably, that the reasonableness of any non-wasteful
use, including interbasin transfer, is statutorily assumed.
229. Id. § 62.1-113. No MRC permit is therefore required.
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stream owners to an average flow determined by the court. Al-
though the flow for maintenance of instream uses below the im-
poundment would have to be held at least at the level of the
upstream flow, the court on its own or at the SWCB's recommen-
dation could presumably impose additional requirements, such as
flow augmentation in drought periods. However, the statute's ap-
plicability is restricted by the definition of "watercourse, '"2 30 which
applies only to rivers, streams, etc., which are nonnavigable in fact
and which lie wholly within the jurisdiction of the state.23' Fur-
thermore, the chapter does not apply to any project undertaken
pursuant to the Virginia Water Power Development Act 232 or to
any case which requires federal "consent," for example, a section
404 permit 33 or a FERC license.23 4 As the federal government's
permit jurisdiction has been so broadened with the enactment of
the Clean Water Act's section 404 permit program, it is difficult to
imagine many circumstances where this exclusion would not ap-
ply.23 5 The most that can be said about the Floodwater Statute,
then, is that in those few cases where it does apply, it would re-
quire flow protection of a sort by requiring that the impoundment
have a zero net effect; that is, it must actually withdraw only "ex-
cess" water. The primary reason for this provision is to protect
downstream riparian owners, but the broad power given to the
SWCB and to the circuit court allows for the imposition of condi-
tions sufficient to protect instream uses.2 3 Such permit conditions
would likely be necessary to protect flow levels, despite the statu-
tory "average flow" requirement, which is of little use standing
alone.
230. Id. § 62.1-104(4).
231. This apparently is intended to exclude those streams actually used in commercial
navigation, as opposed to those that can be made navigable with improvements. It is unclear
whether it would exclude intrastate tributaries of interstate waterways.
232. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-80 to -103 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
233. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
234. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982). See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
235. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-114 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
236. For example, the "average flow" requirements could be met by periodic releases with
little or no flow in the interim periods. This might meet the requirements of the statute,
satisfy downstream owners and even be beneficial to some uses such as recreation. It might,
however, be harmful to aquatic life, scour bottom habitats, cause excessive bank erosion,
and have other harmful effects.
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3. Water Power Act
Construction of dams for electric power development is a ma-
jor-perhaps the major-factor affecting stream flow in states like
Virginia that do not provide for out-of-basin water allocation.
While such uses are "non-consumptive" in the sense that they
eventually release most of the water back into the stream, they
nonetheless require controls to ensure adequate flows in drought
periods and to prevent excessive fluctuations that may destroy
aquatic habitats, cause bank erosion and otherwise impose flow-
related impacts on the downstream reaches.
Primary state jurisdiction over all aspects of water power devel-
opment in Virginia is vested in the State Corporation Commission
(SCC) under the 1928 Water Power Act.,37 Although the Act im-
poses State licensing requirements on hydroelectric and certain
other impoundments, its applicability to many projects is limited
by the extensive federal preemption established by the Federal
Power Act.238 The discussion that follows-insofar as it relates to
the SCC licensing authority-is pertinent to those SCC-regulated
impoundments over which the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission would lack jurisdiction. In addition, the Virginia Water
Power Act has been construed to give primacy to the SCC in deter-
mining the conditions for certification of federally-licensed water
power projects under section 401 of the Clean Water Act.239
The Water Power Act's purpose is the conservation and utiliza-
tion of the "otherwise wasted energy from the water powers in this
State," it is stated policy
to encourage the utilization of the water resources in the State to
the greatest practicable extent and to control the waters of the State
... and also the construction ... of a dam in any river or stream
within the State for the generation of hydroelectric energy for use or
sale in public service .... 240
237. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-80 to -103 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
238. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1982).
239. See infra notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-80 (Repl. Vol. 1982). This is a prime example of the kind of
conflicting policy language found throughout the Code. Contrast it, for example, with the
language found in §§ 10-167, 62.1-11 and 62.1-44.2. These sections relegate water power
development either to a clearly subordinate position, as in the case of the Scenic Rivers Act,
id. § 10-167 (Repl. Vol. 1978), or require that it be given, at most, equal status with other
beneficial uses, as in the latter two sections. This problem becomes one of more than aca-
demic interest, as we will see, because permits for water power projects are issued, not by
524 [Vol. 18:485
STREAM FLOW MAINTENANCE
The term "waters of the State" is defined in the Act as: (1) any
stream declared navigable prior to June 21, 1932, (2) any stream
or stream segment the bed of which is owned by the Common-
wealth, or (3) any stream or other body of water which is used or
suitable for use in its natural or improved state for transportation
of goods in interstate or foreign commerce, and any other stream
in which the construction of a dam or works would affect interstate
or foreign commerce.24' This definition essentially incorporates
those bodies of water meeting the test of navigability traditionally
applied to determine federal admiralty or FERC jurisdiction,2 4' as
well as some nonnavigable streams that would be included because
of state bed ownership. The Virginia Supreme Court has construed
the Act to extend jurisdiction to any commercial hydroelectric pro-
ject in the state, regardless of the navigability of the stream in
question. 43
Administration of the Water Power Act is charged to the State
Corporation Commission, which is empowered to exercise the
State's "paramount" control and regulation of the development of
the waters of the state.244 The Act provides, however, that the state
may exercise this power to the detriment of riparian owners only
by condemnation and payment of just compensation.245
The Act prohibits construction or reconstruction of any dam
across or in the "waters of the state" '246 or a dam in any river or
streams "within the State" when such dam is for the commercial
generation of hydroelectric power, without a license from the
SCC. 247 License proceedings include application with proper plans
and specifications, consultation with the SWCB, and notice and
the SWCB, but by the State Corporation Commission.
241. Id. § 62.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1982). Note that this would exclude most, if not all streams
covered by the Floodwaters Statute. See supra notes 219-36 and accompanying text. Also, it
is a much narrower definition than the "State Waters" over which the Commonwealth ex-
erts its police power jurisdiction. Id. § 62.1-44.3(4).
242. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405-10 (1940) (applying
a test of capacity for navigation to determine the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commis-
sion (now FERC)); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (establishing the jurisdiction of
the admiralty courts over navigable waters). It does not, however, necessarily include waters
that are regulated or "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(1982). See supra note 14. These statutes encompass virtually all waters of the United
States, regardless of their actual or potential navigability.
243. Vaughan v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 211 Va. 500, 178 S.E.2d 682 (1971).
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-82 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
245. Id.
246. As defined in id. § 62.1-81.
247. Id. § 62.1-82.
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hearing. Before making its determination, the SCC must "weight
all the respective advantages and disadvantages from the stand-
point of the State as a whole and the people thereof" and investi-
gate the effect of the project on local governments and the pro-
spective development of natural resources and private property.2
48
The Commission is required to grant the license if, "in pursuance
of the . . . policy of the State to encourage water power develop-
ment," it finds that the applicant's plans provide for the "greatest
practicable extent of utilization" of the stream in question and
that "the general public interest will be promoted thereby."249 The
license may be denied if the project is deemed inadequate, wasteful
or "prejudicial to the public interest. ' 250 The Commission may in-
clude such terms and conditions in the license as it determines are
reasonably necessary for public safety and prevent "unreasonable"
obstruction of existing navigation or interference with stream
flow.
2 5 1
The scope of the Water Power Act was initially determined in
the case of Garden Club of Virginia v. Virginia Public Service
Co.2 152 This case involved a challenge to the SCC's refusal to take
regulatory jurisdiction over a proposed hydroelectric dam across
the North (now Maury) River at Goshen Pass, on the ground that
the project did not involve waters of the State as defined in the
Act.253
The parties stipulated that the river had never been declared
navigable, had never been used and was not suitable for use in in-
terstate or foreign commerce and that the bed was privately
owned. However, water impounded by the project would have re-
quired the relocation of a public highway; thus it was argued that
the "interests of interstate and foreign commerce" would be af-
fected and, therefore, SCC approval was required. The court re-
fused to construe the Act so liberally, and held that the definition
applied only to effects on waterborne commerce.254
248. Id. § 62.1-88.
249. Id. § 62.1-89.
250. Id. § 62.1-90.
251. Id. § 62.1-91.
252. 153 Va. 659, 151 S.E. 161 (1930).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 674, 151 S.E. at 165. The court cited, as an example, interference with a hypo-
thetical barge canal adjacent to an impounded stream, which itself did not meet any of the
other conditions for applicability. Note that the provisions of VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-83
(Repl. Vol. 1982), which refer distinctly to dams on "waters of the State" and "rivers or
streams within the State when such dam is for the purpose of generating hydroelectric en-
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In the later case of Vaughan v. Vepco,25 5 adjoining property
owners challenged the Commission's authority to license Vepco's
impoundment on the North Anna River for the purpose of provid-
ing cooling water to the North Anna Nuclear Power Station. They
argued that the North Anna did not meet any of the criteria for
definition as waters of the State in the Water Power Act, 56 and
that the SCC would, therefore, have jurisdiction only if the project
was for hydroelectric power generation.25 Because the impound-
ment would be used to supply cooling water rather than to gener-
ate power, they argued, the SCC had no authority to license the
dam.
The court agreed that the Commission's authority over "waters
within the State" was limited to hydroelectric dams. As to "waters
of the State," however, the court held that "the authority of the
commission extends to the licensing of any dam . . . regardless of
[its] purpose."25 The North Anna River met the definition of "wa-
ters of the State," the court ruled, because the electricity gener-
ated at the power station would flow through interstate transmis-
sion lines and the construction of the cooling water impoundment
would therefore "affect the interests of interstate or foreign com-
merce within the meaning of [the statute]." '259 No attempt was
made to reconcile this holding with the comparatively narrow con-
struction applied in Garden Club.260 The opinion makes it clear,
however, that the SCC's jurisdiction extends to any dam on the
"waters of the State," whether or not the dam is associated with a
power generating facility, that any dam associated with a facility
that generates electricity for sale in interstate commerce will prob-
ably "bootstrap" the stream into "waters of the State" status, and
that any commercial hydroelectric dam falls under SCC jurisdic-
tion regardless of the status of the stream. Accordingly, the state
agency with primary jurisdiciton over most major impoundments
in Virginia is the State Corporation Commission. At the same time,
the State Water Control Board has the responsibility to implement
ergy" would appear to encompass this project.
255. 211 Va. 500, 178 S.E.2d 682 (1971).
256. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
257. That is, jurisdiction must be found under the provision applicable to hydroelectric
dams for "waters within the State," which the court assumed to mean all streams not
otherwise fitting the definition of "waters of the State." Vaughan, 211 Va. at 501, 178
S.E.2d at 684.
258. Id. at 502, 178 S.E.2d at 684.
259. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1982)).
260. 153 Va. 659, 151 S.E. 161 (1930).
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the policies set forth in the State Water Control Law26' and, with
respect to federally-licensed projects, to administer the certifica-
tion program under section 401 of the Clean Water Act.262 This
poses the potential for jurisdictional conflict, although conflict has
usually been more perceived than real.
The jurisdictional issue did arise in 1970 over the licensing of the
impoundment for the North Anna Nuclear Power Station. The
SCC issued a license for the project in 1969, incorporating mini-
mum release schedules for the maintenance of flow in the river be-
low the dam.26 3 Subsequently, the SWCB amended the SCC certif-
icate, incorporating higher flow release requirements and certifying
that the requirements would be sufficient to protect water quality
standards.264
Prompted by concerns about the seemingly conflicting jurisdic-
tional requirements of the Water Power Act and the State Water
Control Law, the Board sought an opinion from the Attorney Gen-
eral on the issue of whether it had the authority to require more
stringent flow release requirements than those imposed by the
SCC, if the requirement were deemed necessary to protect water
quality below the impoundment.26 5 The Attorney General acknowl-
261. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(1) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
262. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Section 401 requires any applicant for a federal license or
permit to conduct any activity which may result in any discharge into the waters of the
U.S., as encompassed by the Clean Water Act, to obtain certification from the state in which
the discharge will originate that the project will comply with applicable water quality re-
quirements. The State Water Control Board was given the responsibility to administer the
program by Governor Holton in 1970 (letter of June 25, 1970). See 1971 Op. Va. Att'y Gen.
453. At that time the requirement was contained in section 21(b) of the Federal Water Qual-
ity Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 21(b), 84 Stat. 91, 108-10 (1970), and applied only to waters
meeting the traditional test of navigability. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. Be-
cause of the pervasive federal licensing authority over hydroelectric projects and the Corps
of Engineers Rivers and Harbors Act and Clean Water Act, and jurisdiction over other im-
pounding structures, the state function is ordinarily exercised in the context of section 401
and the federal proceeding. See infra notes 306-35 and accompanying text.
263. State Corporation Commission certificate no. 1912, issued June 19, 1969.
264. It was later determined that, because the Corps of Engineers concluded that the
North Anna River was not navigable, the state certification requirement did not apply. Sub-
sequent changes in the federal law would mandate a different result today. (Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1349), added to the Code in 1972, requires a permit from
the Corps of Engineers for the discharge of dredge or fill material into the waters of the
United States. The Corps has, by regulation extended the program to cover all waters sub-
ject to CWA jurisdiction and their adjoining wetlands. 33 C.F.R. § 3232. The North Anna
River, while nonnavigable in the traditional sense, is navigable for CWA jurisdiction. Issu-
ance of a section 404 permit would trigger the state certification requirement under section
401 (33 U.S.C. § 1341)).
265. 1971 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 452.
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edged the "apparent discrepancy" between the two statutes, com-
menting that both agencies had been granted broad powers in ar-
eas of major concern. He resolved the discrepancy in favor of the
SCC by resorting to the language of section 62.1-82,266 which speci-
fies that the "paramount" control of the State in the control and
regulation of its waters pursuant to the Act is to be exercised
through the Commission. Although the Attorney General acknowl-
edged the large body of environmental law that had been enacted
since the 1928 passage of the Water Power Act (including the State
Water Control Law), he cited section 62.1-44.6 of the SWCL,6 7
which makes that law supplementary rather than preemptive, the
broad policy language of the Water Power Act,268 and the strong
presumption against repeal by implication, to support his opinion
that "in water power projects the final decision as to flow release
schedules is that of the State Corporation C~mmission. '269
However, the opinion contined, section 62.1-44.6 of the SWCL
also requires that the administration of other laws pertaining to
the pollution of State waters "shall be in accord with" the
SWCL.27 0 Therefore, the SCC is required to "consider the advice
and judgment" of the SWCB regarding water quality effects of
projects it licenses.2 7 1 As to the effect of this consultation require-
ment on the resolution of differences between the two agencies, the
opinion does not offer much encouragement. The Attorney General
determined that exercise of the SWCB's federal water quality cer-
tification authority under section 401272 was subordinate to the
SCC licensing power and could not contravene the SCC's license
conditions. Therefore, he concluded, the SWCB does not have the
authority to issue a certificate incorporating a flow maintenance
schedule more stringent than that in the SCC license and any con-
flicts must be resolved in favor of the SCC.273
266. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-82 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
267. Id. § 62.1-44.6.
268. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
269. 1971 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 452, 455.
270. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.6 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
271. 1971 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 452, 456.
272. See supra note 262.
273. 1971 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 452, 457. In closing, the Attorney General acknowledged a
problem inherent in Virginia's environmental regulatory programs and suggested a solution
that-nearly 15 years later-has yet to be adequately resolved:
[This case has] focused upon the delicate-but crucial-policy problems confronting
both corporate and private entities: how best to balance and accommodate the grow-
ing need for electric power and the necessity for environmental protection and en-
hancement. These problems are heightened when governmental responsibilities are
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Although in practice the SCC has tended to rely upon the
SWCB for determination of stream flow requirements, it is not re-
quired to accept the Board's recommendations. Furthermore, the
Commission's mandate under the Water Power Act, to encourage
and promote the utilization of State waters for power development,
is not necessarily compatible with the policies administered by the
SWCB. SWCB policies provide for multiple beneficial use, speak-
ing to the protection, maintenance and enhancement of State wa-
ters for all reasonable public uses and for the propagation and
growth of aquatic life274 and to the regulation, control, develop-
ment, and use of waters for "all purposes beneficial to the pub-
lic."275 Where the multiple beneficial use concept is to be altered in
favor of economic development (at least on waters of better quality
than applicable standards), the proposal must satisfy both strin-
gent tests of necessity and conditions to ensure protection of pre-
sent and anticipated uses.2 6 For all projects other than those li-
censed by the SCC, the multiple beneficial use, non-degradation
requirements apply.117 Because the SCC's authority is not subordi-
nated to the SWCL, the resolution of an actual conflict between
optimal generating capacity and sufficient flow maintenance would
appear to be in the direction of development. This assumption is
highly tentative, however, because of changes since publication of
the 1971 Attorney General's Opinion.
The Water Power Act has always required the SCC to find that
"the general public interest" will be promoted by issuance of a li-
cense thereunder.2 78 Although this requirement is modified by the
mandate that its findings be made in pursuance of explicit State
policy to encourage water-power development,179 the Commission
has since been placed under other requirements that can be con-
strued to require a broader view of "the public interest." First, and
fragmented, conflicting or in need of clarification. In such cases, it would seem advisa-
ble to consider legislation to delineate clear lines of responsibility. In this case, espe-
cially, there is a definite need to consider the legislation that would redefine-and
perhaps redetermine-more clearly the locus of responsibility for controlling stream
flow releases from water power projects where water quality standards of the State
are affected.
Id.
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.2(1) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
275. Id. § 62.1-11(b).
276. Id. § 62.1-44.4(2).
277. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982).
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-89 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
279. Id.
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most important, is the constitutional expression of the public in-
terest in protecting the environment of the Commonwealth "from
pollution, impairment or destruction ..2.8.
The SCC is expressly required to exercise its authority subject to
the Virginia Constitution.28' In determining whether issuance of a
license under the Water Power Act will in fact serve the public
interest, the Commission must follow the public policy expressed
in article XI, which is itself intended to promote the "general wel-
fare of the people of the Commonwealth" by protecting the envi-
ronment.282 As one commentator has stated, referring to the re-
sponsibilities of Virginia agencies under article XI:
It is most clear that a Virginia agency must observe the mandate of
[article XI], section 1 where the relevant enabling legislation re-
quires the agency to consider the "public interest" . . . before act-
ing. An agency's action cannot ... be in the "public interest" if no
attention has been given, where relevant, to environmental conse-
quences of the action.283
In order to fulfill its constitutional responsibility, the SCC (as
must all state agencies) must weigh environmental impacts and al-
ternatives and incorporate those factors into its decision.
The Virginia Environmental Quality Act,2 84 enacted in 1972, pro-
vides that "[i]n furtherance of Article XI of the Constitution of
Virginia" it is the policy of the Commonwealth to promote the wise
use of its environment and resources and to protect them from pol-
lution and impairment, as well as to "initiate, implement, improve
and coordinate environmental plans, programs and functions of
the State in order to promote the general welfare" of the State's
citizens.285 Agencies are directed to interpret and administer "the
laws, regulations and policies of the Commonwealth" in accordance
with the policies of the Act.286
280. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
281. Id. art. IX, § 2.
282. Id. art. XI, § 1.
283. Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193, 211-12
(1972).
284. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-177 to -186 (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
285. Id. § 10-178 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
286. Id. § 10-179. Note that this imposes a requirement on agencies to look beyond their
own statutes and programs and consider relevant requirements of statutes not directly ap-
plicable to them. In the case of the SCC, this would include the State Water Control Law,
for example. This is consistent with the holding in Blue Cross of Va. v. Commonwealth, 211
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Changes in the statutory provisions enacted in 1972, under
which the SCC regulates electric utility facilities, require that the
Commission give consideration to the environmental effects of fa-
cilities it licenses and "establish such conditions as may be desira-
ble or necessary to minimize adverse environmental impact. 2 8 7
Furthermore, the SCC is required to "receive and give considera-
tion to all reports" from state environmental agencies that relate
to the facility. 28
Finally, other enactments of state policy that impact directly on
the SCC's impoundment licensing authority override the SCC's au-
thority under the Water Power Act in certain cases. The clearest
example is the Virginia Scenic Rivers Act,28 9 which requires "full
consideration and evaluation of [any] river as a scenic resource"
before impoundments or other uses that may change the character
of the river can be approved.2 90 The General Assembly, based on
review and recommendations by the Commission of Outdoor Rec-
reation, SWCB and other agencies, may designate any stream or
segment as a scenic river.2 91 After the General Assembly makes
such a determination, legislative authority is required for the con-
struction of any dam or impoundment. 92 The Act assures that des-
ignated scenic rivers cannot be dammed without an evaluation of
the public's use and enjoyment of the river and its value as a
scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, or cultural
resource.
293
While the Scenic River Act may itself be an effective tool to
achieve substantive stream flow protection in some cases, it also
imposes on the SCC the duty to evaluate flow-related factors prior
to licensing any impoundment, regardless of whether a Scenic
River designation is eventually made.294 There is no clear mandate
in the Act, however, respecting the effect of such evaluation in
those cases where the decision is made not to designate a river
scenic. There is no "intermediate" level of protection under the
Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970).
287. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-46.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
288. Id.
289. Id. §§ 10-167 to -175 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
290. Id. § 10-167(d).
291. Id. § 10-174. Only a few designations have been made, most recently the Falls of the
James River in Richmond. See id. § 10-176.
292. Id. § 10-174.
293. Id. § 10-167(c), (d).
294. Id. § 10-167(d).
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Act for streams that don't make it into the Scenic River system.
However, the data necessary to conduct a satisfactory evaluation
for Scenic River status will nonetheless be relevant to analysis re-
quired under other statutory and constitutional requirements.
Although it can be argued convincingly that constitutional and
legislative developments since the 1971 Attorney General's opinion
have substantially altered the balance of factors to be considered
in a licensing decision and have relatively diminished the develop-
ment bias in the Water Power Act, the decision on flow mainte-
nance requirements for projects covered by the Water Power Act
still technically rests with the SCC. Likewise, although water qual-
ity compliance certification for federal licensing under section 401
of the Clean Water Act is the responsibility of the State Water
Control Board, the Commission has the final say in the conditions
affecting those projects which it has authority to license under the
Water Power Act. While the SWCB must be consulted, it does not
have the authority to overrule the SCC1 95
While article XI and subsequent statutory enactments broaden
the range of relevant factors, there is no bright line to balance
water power development versus water quality requirements in set-
ting license conditions. Presumably, the SCC could establish con-
ditions that would not satisfy the policy requirements of the State
Water Control Law, leaving to judicial interpretation the effect of
article XI and the subsequently-enacted statutory policies. Given
the SWCB's clear mandate to exercise supervision and control in
all areas of water quality296 as well as its specialized expertise in
such matters, clearly a more satisfactory arrangement would be to
give the SWCB primacy in setting stream flow and other water
quality requirements for all impoundments, whether in the context
of SCC licensing or section 401 certification, regardless of other
agency jurisdiction. 97
295. See supra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
296. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(1) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
297. As a practical matter, there are few circumstances where a federal permit would not
be required for a project within the SCC's Water Power Act jurisdiction. Thus, the primary
vehicle for establishing water quality requirements would be the section 401 certificate and
licenses or permits issued pursuant to federal law.
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4. State Control of Federally-Licensed Hydroelectric Plants
As mentioned above, most impoundments designed with a hy-
droelectric component require licensing under federal law.2 e9 Ex-
tensive substantive and procedural requirements under federal law
must be satisfied to assure adequate consideration of environmen-
tal factors prior to federal project licensing. 99 Flow maintenance
conditions would be established in the context of developing the
federal license.
The balancing process at the federal level, however, is compli-
cated by a jurisdictional split similar to that existing between the
SWCB and the SCC. On the one hand, subchapter I of the Federal
Power Act,300 empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) to exercise control over water power development.
FERC's jurisdiction extends to projects with any water power com-
ponent, not merely to projects whose primary purpose is water
power development.30' With the exception of projects located on or
affecting federal reservations, courts have generally construed the
authority of FERC to be comprehensive and exclusive. 2  When
Congress transferred the functions and authority of the Federal
Power Commission to the FERC in 1977,03 it gave FERC exclusive
jurisdiction over matters formerly charged to the FPC and stated
that matters transferred to FERC were within the "sole responsi-
bility of [FERC] to consider and to take final agency action on
without further review by ... any other executive branch offi-
cial.' ' 304 The power to issue licenses for hydroelectric projects is
specifically included in the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction to
FERC.so5
298. See supra notes 60-91 & 262 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., NEPA, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
300. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-828 (1982). The Federal Power Act was initially enacted in 1920 as
the Federal Water Power Act. Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063.
301. See Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 692 F.2d
1223, 1230 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla, 104 S.
Ct. 272 (1983) (Commission's jurisdiction not limited to projects where the primary purpose
is to generate power).
302. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1959); First Iowa
Hydroelec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946); Northwest Paper Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 344 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1965).
303. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565,
583-84 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (Supp. V 1981)).
304. H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 854, 925.
305. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
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Since the enactment of the Federal Water Power Act in 1920,
Congress has substantially expanded the scope of federal activity
in the water quality area. Most notably, the enactment of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Clean
Water Act,3"6 created substantial, substantive authority and duties
in other federal agencies to regulate water quality in virtually all
U.S. waters. The agencies with primary responsibility under the
Clean Water Act are the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). EPA administers
the Act generally, 30 7 while the Corps is given regulatory responsi-
bility for the administration of the dredge and fill permit program
of section 404.318 Under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the
Corps is also given licensing authority over construction of any
dam or dike across navigable waters,309 or any other construction
in or alteration of U.S. navigable waters.310
Under the "404" program, a Corps permit is required for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the "navigable waters,"
which under the Clean Water Act includes virtually all waters of
the U.S.31' Primary authority for administration of the program
may be transferred to the states, 1 2 although this function has not
been sought or assumed by Virginia. When certain restrictions on
disposal areas may be imposed by the EPA Administrator," 3 the
Secretary of the Interior, acting through the director of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, must be given the opportunity to
comment.314
Absent an express or implied exemption, section 404 applies to
hydroelectric projects licensed under the Federal Power Act.3 15
The question thus arises whether FERC-licensed projects are ex-
306. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-211, 91 Stat. 1566
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). Officially referred to as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.
307. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
308. Id. § 1344.
309. Id. § 401.
310. Id. § 403.
311. See Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehike, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978). See supra note 14.
312. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (1982).
313. Id. § 1344(c).
314. Id.
315. Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to any
activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to
which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters
may be impaired . shall be required to have a permit under this section.
Id. § 1344(f)(2).
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empt from its requirements because of the latter statute's apparent
conferral of exclusive jurisdiction in FERC over water power
projects.316 There is a clear conflict in the federal court decisions
on this question.
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Callaway,17 the
district court examined the coextensive licensing authority of the
Corps and the FPC, and held that projects licensed under the Fed-
eral Power Act were exempt from the Corps' permitting require-
ments under section 10 of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act.3 1 Cit-
ing both the clear legislative intent behind the 1920 Federal Water
Power Act 19 and the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in
First Iowa Hydroelectric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commis-
sion,20 the court had "no hesistation in holding that the Federal
Power Act preempted the Corps' § 10 authority to grant permits
for the construction of hydroelectric plants," 2' leaving the Corps,
under its section 10 authority, with the function of making recom-
mendations to the FPC concerning matters affecting navigation.
As for section 404, however, the court held that the comprehen-
sive purpose of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments,322 together with the outright prohibition on the un-
permitted discharge of pollutants contained in the Clean Water
Act's section 301323 and the lack of any applicable exemption from
permitting requirements in section 404, indicated that the Clean
Water Act was intended to apply to FPC-licensed projects.2 4 The
court rejected the utility's argument that the Clean Water Act's
316. See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
317. 370 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974). This case was
part of the long-running and well-known battle over Consolidated Edison's Storm King
Mountain pumped storage hydroelectric project. The "Scenic Hudson" cases (Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) [Scenic Hudson I]; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972)
[Scenic Hudson Il) are early landmarks in the development of environmental law, requir-
ing federal licensing agencies to fully examine environmental factors in performing their
regulatory functions. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
318. 370 F. Supp. at 168. Section 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982), which is primarily for the
protection of navigation in the navigable waters, prohibits construction in or modification of
the channel of navigable waters without a permit from the Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
319. 370 F. Supp. at 165-66 (citing Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982)).
320. Id. (citing 328 U.S. 152 (1946)).
321. Id. at 167.
322. Id. at 169 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982)).
323. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982)).
324. Id. at 168-69.
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section 511(a)325 served as an exemption because the FPC, under
the Federal Power Act, would perform all the environmental func-
tions of the Corps and EPA in any event. The court observed that,
while the FPC could fulfill the requirements of section 404, noth-
ing in the Federal Power Act required it to do so. This made the
statutes inconsistent, in the court's opinion, so that section 511
would not apply.326
The opposite result was reached in the more recent case of Mo-
nongahela Power Co. v. Alexander, s7 which involved a challenge
to the Corps' denial of a 404 permit for a project licensed by the
FPC. The court noted two significant intervening events that justi-
fied a departure from Scenic Hudson. First, the FPC/FERC's ex-
clusive jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects had been reaffirmed
in the 1977 Energy Organization Act,3 s and second, the Supreme
Court held in 1976, in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research
Group,"29 that exemptions to the comprehensive Clean Water Act
permitting scheme may be inferred in some cases.
3
°
The court rejected the argument that if Congress had wanted to
exempt FPC-licensed projects, it would have done so in the 1977
Clean Water Act amendments. It found instead that the two stat-
utes were not irreconcilable; therefore, the presumption against re-
peal by implication required that the FPC's exclusive jurisdiction
be affirmed. In finding the statutes compatible, the court gave
much weight to what it found to be similar mandates to the agen-
cies to weigh specific factors, including environmental factors, in
determining the public interest-the fundamental criterion in
granting a permit or license. The court disagreed with the argu-
ment, based on the holding in Scenic Hudson,331 that the FPC's
review of environmental factors was discretionary and that its mis-
sion was so different from that of the Corps that the programs
325. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1982)).
326. Id. at 170-71.
327. 507 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1980).
328. Id. at 389.
329. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
330. 507 F. Supp. at 389. Colorado PIRG held that source, by-product and special nuclear
materials regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission were not subject to control under the
Clean Water Act's (CWA) NPDES permit program, supra note 201, because of the AEC's
exclusive jurisdiction in that area. 426 U.S. at 25. As the Court noted in Monongahela
Power, however, the legislative history of the CWA supported such an exemption. 507 F.
Supp. at 389. No such exemption could be found in the legislative history for FPC-licensed
projects, id., so the court relied on other factors to find the "inferable exemption."
331. See supra notes 68-72 & 317-26 and accompanying text.
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were in fact irreconcilable. It found instead that the FPC was ex-
pressly required to weigh all relevant factors, including environ-
mental protection, recreation, fish, wildlife and wilderness preser-
vation, and that while its emphasis might differ from that of the
Corps, the difference was not sufficient to support an implied
repeal.332
Where Monongahela Power33 3 will leave the section 404 permit
program vis-a-vis FERC-licensed hydroelectric projects is open to
question; the case is still on appeal. Whatever the ultimate out-
come, it is clear that FERC is required to weigh and incorporate
relevant environmental factors into its decision when considering a
license application. These requirements apply under the agency's
own regulations33 4 as well as under the National Environmental
Policy Act and other federal statutes as discussed above. 3 5
It is reasonable to argue that despite these factors, FERC's
power development responsibilities may result in a less environ-
mentally-oriented emphasis than that applied by the Corps under
section 404 of the CWA. However, the courts have consistently re-
quired the Commission to include both environmental and conser-
vation factors, including preservation of adequate stream flow and
fish habitat in its determination of the public interest.336
The implications of the Clean Water Act's non-applicability are
of more concern with respect to the section 401 certification pro-
gram, although again the Federal Power Act makes provision for
state input on these aspects of a project. Under section 401, as
noted above, 31 states may veto the issuance of a federal license by
refusing to certify project compliance with state water quality
standards, or more frequently, the state may insist upon the inclu-
sion of certain conditions (for example, maintenance of minimum
flows) before it grants certification. If, under the reasoning of Mo-
nongahela Power, the Federal Power Act is construed as unaf-
332. 507 F. Supp. at 391-92 (citing NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662
(1976); Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967); Greene County Planning
Board v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972);
Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d 608; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4371
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
333. 507 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1980).
334. 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.41, 4.51 (1983).
335. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
336. See Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967); Hudson River Fisher-
mans Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1974); Scenic Hudson I, 354
F.2d 608.
337. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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fected by the CWA, then the state certification requirement is like-
wise cast in doubt. The Federal Power Act provides that nothing
contained therein "shall be construed as affecting . . .[state laws]
.. .relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any
vested right acquired therein. '338 Applicants for hydroelectric li-
censes must submit "[slatisfactory evidence" that they have com-
plied with state law requirements "with respect to bed and banks
and to the appropriation, diversion and use of water. 339 These re-
quirements are by no means comparable to the state veto power
granted by the CWA's section 401.340 In First Iowa Hydroelectric
Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,34, the Supreme Court
made it clear that the FPC could require the applicant to show
compliance with those state requirements that the Commission
considered appropriate to "effect the purposes of a federal li-
cense." 342 However, it was within the Commission's discretion to
determine the extent to which state requirements were material.
Compliance with state requirements was not a condition precedent
to the granting of a federal license, nor were state requirements
necessarily incorporated into the federal standards.343 State re-
quirements are merely advisory in the case of an actual conflict.
This construction has been consistently applied with respect to
FPC/FERC licensing authority,344 and appears consistent with the
initial intent of the Federal Power Act. The effect of section 401 of
the CWA on the formerly and indisputably exclusive scheme of
federal control over hydroelectric projects on navigable waters is
another matter. The CWA was enacted long after the Federal
Power Act and contains no express exemption for FPC/FERC-li-
censed facilities; in fact, it is worded in rather absolute form.3 45
The only change to section 401 made since its enactment has been
to make clear that compliance by FERC-licensed facilities with
338. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1982).
339. Id. § 802(b).
340. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
341. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
342. Id. at 167.
343. Id. at 170. The requirement at issue was a state law mandating that any water used
must be returned to the stream at "the nearest practicable place" without being materially
diminished, polluted or "rendered deleterious to fish life." Id. at 166.
344. See Springfield v. Vermont Envtl. Bd., 521 F. Supp. 243, 250 (D. Vt. 1981).
345. "No license or permit shall be granted until the certification ... has been obtained
.... No license or permit shall be granted if certification has been denied ...... 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)(1) (1982).
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state water quality standards adopted under section 303 was in-
tended.3 46 The legislative history of the 1972 amendments gives
some support to the position that section 401 is not subordinated
to the Federal Power Act.347
Furthermore, even if the approach used in Monongahela Power
were applied to determine the effect of section 401, there are suffi-
cient differences between section 401 and section 404 to justify dif-
ferent results. Section 401 does not by its terms establish a parallel
federal permitting program, as section 404 does; instead, it gives
states the authority to veto or demand that appropriate conditions
be placed in any federal license, regardless of the issuing agency. 48
Although judicial authority is sparse, the prevailing view is that
the exclusive federal jurisdiction in this area has been somewhat
modified, empowering states to review FPC/FERC licenses under
section 401. In no case, however, was the court faced with a pro-
posed state veto or refusal to certify a project. Because section 401
provides for inclusion of state-recommended conditions in the fed-
eral project license, and because FERC itself is under a strong stat-
utory mandate to protect water quality and stream resources,"' it
is unlikely that state recommendations would be challenged on
preemption grounds as long as they fell short of blocking a project
that FERC was prepared to license. The effect of a state refusal to
certify, or a conditional certification (for example, stream flow
maintenance requirements) that would make a FERC-licensed pro-
ject economically unviable, is uncertain.
5. Virginia Endangered Species Act
While state laws to protect endangered fish and wildlife species
may sometimes be useful elements of a stream flow protection
346. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4326, 4397.
347. See comments of Senator Muskie, during the Senate debate: "[Federal] agencies
shall accept as dispositive the determinations of EPA and the States (under section 401...
of the FWPCA ... )." 118 CONG. REc. 33,701 (1972).
348. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
349. Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 379 F. Supp. 243 (N.D.
N.Y. 1974) (section 401 requires FPC licensees to comply with state standards, even if those
are more stringent than federal requirements); de Rham v. Diamond, 343 N.Y.S.2d 84, 90
(1973) (FPC license preempts all state licensing requirements, but states may review appli-
cation to determine "narrow question" of whether a project will comply with State Water
Quality Standards).
350. FERC requires section 401 certification as part of the application package. Thus,
there is no contention by that agency that section 401 is superseded.
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strategy,3 51 the Virginia Endangered Species Act3 52 does not offer
any help in that regard. The Act restricts only the taking, trans-
porting, handling and selling of endangered fish and wildlife spe-
cies. 53 It does not provide for the protection of their habitats, nor
does it authorize the Game Commission to regulate for that pur-
pose.354 Thus, there is no direct authority under Virginia law to
establish minimum flows to protect endangered species.
D. Relevant State Water Control Board Regulations and
Policies
As discussed earlier, the Virginia Code contains adequate au-
thority to support a state stream flow protection program. An ex-
amination of the State Water Control Board's regulations, policies
and standards indicates that the Board is cognizant of some re-
sponsibility in this area, but it has avoided directly specifying re-
quirements in particular cases.
1. Water Resources Policy
The State Water Control Board's "Water Resources Policy,"
adopted in 1974,35' devotes a significant amount of attention to
flow maintenance issues, but its effectiveness as an affirmative
mechanism is questionable. As an adopted policy, it cannot be en-
tirely ignored by the agency. However, the policy is only a general,
self-imposed guideline and has no regulatory requirements of its
own.
The policy consists of three parts. Part 1.0 states general and
unexceptionable findings upon which water resource policy must
be based, including a finding relevant to this inquiry, that surface
flow quality is dependent on the quantity of the flow.3 56 Part 2.0 of
the policy declares that the purpose for adopting the policy is to
351. See DEWSNUP & JENSEN, PROMISING STRATEGIES FOR RESERVING INSTREAM FLows 13
(1977) (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Publication).
352. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29-230 to -237 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
353. Endangered species are defined in the Act to include those species listed by the Sec-
retary of the Interior as endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1541 (1982), and those listed by the Virgnia Commission of Game and Inland Fish-
eries under VA. CODE ANN. § 27-233 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
354. Id. § 29-234.
355. STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES (2d ed. 1982).
356. See State Water Control Board Policy § 1.6 (1982), ("Quality of surface flows is, to a
degree, dependent upon quanities of flow, natural pollution sources, and in part, activities of
man.").
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fulfill certain of the Board's "statutory responsibilities," which,
again, include several factors that are relevant to stream flow regu-
lation.357 Part 3.0 contains the "specific policies" adopted by the
Board for its use "in the preparation of Water Resource Manage-
ment Plans, advising on the adequacy/desirability of water re-
source projects or in commenting on prospects which affect water
resources." 358 The "specific policies" bearing on flow considerations
are:
3.2.1 - The natural values and natural processes occurring in water
resources in an undisturbed state constitute a substantial social and
economic benefit . . . and (this) protection . . . should be consid-
ered in any resources management plan.
3.2.4 - Flow releases from reservoirs for the purpose of maintaining
minimum flows necessary for prevention of eutrophic conditions
(due to natural sources); protection of fish and wildlife values,
marine organisms; and protection of aesthetic values will be consid-
ered as beneficial uses.3 59
3.2.5 - Generation of electricity by hydropower, both in conventional
and pump storage developments, is considered a beneficial use of
water resources, provided that the system is so operated that neither
maximum nor minimum operations flow releases are unreasonable
and so that the rate of flow does not change so rapidly as to be
hazardous.36 0
357. The Board is directed to "[a]ssure, insofar as possible, that domestic, municipal, in-
dustrial, agricultural and other water quality and quantity needs are met at all times consis-
tent with the responsibility of the State to protect the natural values of Virginia's water
resources and assure equitable allocations in times of shortage consistent with ... Virginia
law," State Water Control Board Policy § 2.1 (1982); "[rlecognize the importance of water
transportation to the economy and recreation, and assure the optimum use of waterways in
Virginia," id. § 2.3; "[rlecognize and foster the unique and diverse role of water in recrea-
tion," id. § 2.4; and "[e]xercise the responsibility of the State within the framework of the
existing common law riparian rights of land owners," id. § 2.8.
358. Id. § 3.0.
359. As beneficial uses, these factors would normally be protected under the legislative
policy set forth in the State Water Control Law, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2, -44.4, -44.5,
discussed supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the policy does
not declare them categorically to be beneficial uses, but simply requires that they be consid-
ered in each case, with the decision to be in the Board's discretion. This apparently places
them in the dubious status of what might be called "second-hand" beneficial uses under the
policy.
360. Note the difference in wording between this section and sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.4. Sec-
tion 3.2.5 appears to ensure preferential status to hydropower as a categorical "beneficial
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3.2.7 - The consideration of water resources projects by the Board
shall include coordination with other public agencies in order to in-
sure that all relevant public policy and formal standards will have
an appropriate bearing on the final decision.
3.4.1 - Industrial processes should be designed to minimize system
demand .... As a goal the Board favors the design of industrial
processes with minimum withdrawal.
3.4.2 - Flow releases from reservoir systems to dilute wastes are not
to be considered as a substitute for adequate treatment of waters
from industry, agriculture or municipalities.36
Thus, while the Board has established policies to guide its delib-
erations in authorizing and regulating projects that affect flow vol-
ume, little exists in the nature of hard and definite standards to
which the agency can be held accountable. The policy is suffi-
ciently vague to allow the Board to apply it as it desires.
2. Water Quality Standards
The State Water Control Board is charged with the authority
and duty to promulgate water quality standards for all Virginia
waters 62 and has issued at least rudimentary standards for all of
the stream basins in the state. These standards consist of both
narrative statements that describe water quality requirements in
general terms3 6 and numeric limits for specific chemical, physical
or biological "parameters."364
Certain standards apply statewide, while others apply to specific
use", as long as it meets the very broad criteria of being neither unreasonable nor hazard-
ous. The factors cited in section 3.2.4 would then appear to be little more than precatory,
entitled to no weight unless they could be implemented without intefering with the project's
generation capacity.
361. State Water Control Board Policy § 3 (1982).
362. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
363. State Water Control Board Water Quality Standards § 1.01, pt. A (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Water Quality Standards] requires that "[a]ll state waters shall be maintained at
such quality as will permit all reasonable, beneficial uses and will support the propagation
and growth of all aquatic life, including game fish, which might be expected to inhabit
them."
364. Id. §§ 1.04-.08 (specifying standards for dissolved oxygen, pH and temperature).
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stream segments according to a seven-part classification. As regula-
tions, the standards have substantive status in the administration
of the Board's regulatory programs, particularly the NPDES per-
mit program and the CWA section 401 certification program.
Under the former, the standards may be used as the basis for efflu-
ent limitations imposed on individual dischargers.3 5 Under the lat-
ter, the standards form the basis for the state certification neces-
sary for issuance of the federal license. 66 The Board may certify a
project as in compliance with water quality standards "as is," it
may impose design or operating conditions necessary to ensure
compliance, or it may simply refuse to certify on the ground that
water quality standards cannot be met by any feasible combination
of conditions.
Because the standards refer to instream conditions rather than
effluent quality, they are unavoidably dependent upon flow vol-
ume. Extreme diminution or fluctuations in flow may interfere
with beneficial uses and the stream's ability to support aquatic life,
both of which are required by the general standard. 67 Further-
more, compliance with specific quality requirements, such as dis-
solved oxygen levels, depends on flow.
Wastes discharged into a moving body of water are diluted and
dissipated as they flow downstream. Biodegradable wastes, such as
treated municipal sewage, are broken down, dissipated, and ab-
sorbed by the stream's natural processes. Dissolved oxygen, neces-
sary both for aquatic life and the stream's continued ability to as-
similate wastes, is used in the process. Other demands are placed
on the stream's assimilative capacity, for example, decaying or-
ganic material that is naturally present or that is washed into the
stream from adjacent uplands. As long as the stream's assimilative
capacity is not exceeded, it is capable of maintaining a level of
quality adequate to protect other instream uses. If the capacity is
exceeded, one or more parameters (e.g., dissolved oxygen) may
change sufficiently to place unacceptable stress on some species
and to impair or destroy those uses dependent on the affected pa-
365. This is the alternative to the technology-based effluent standards promulgated by
the EPA and applicable to categories of dischargers. Where compliance with the instream
water quality standard requires tighter control on individual discharges than that provided
by the technology-based standards, the more stringent requirements apply. See supra note
201.
366. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
367. Water Quality Standards, supra note 363.
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rameter 8 A stream's ability to assimilate a given quantity of
wastes (and thereby comply with its designated standards) will
fluctuate depending upon flow level. In large bodies of water,
normal fluctuations are not critical unless the stream is receiving
wastes at its maximum assimilative capacity or it is at extremely
low flow. Smaller streams are less able to dilute and absorb wastes
and are more sensitive to fluctuations in flow.
The Water Quality Standards do not include flow levels as a spe-
cific physical parameter, although artificially-induced flow condi-
tions may violate the broad mandate of the general standard by
interfering with stream uses. The interdependence of stream flow
and water quality is addressed through the indirect mechanism of
establishing a flow level as the benchmark for standards applicabil-
ity. The assimilative capacity of a stream is based on an assumed
flow level which represents below-normal conditions. Thus, the
Water Quality Standards provide that "Stream Standards will ap-
ply whenever flows are equal to, or greater than, the minimum 7-
consecutive day drought [low] flow with a 10-year return fre-
quency.""3 9 While standards "ideally" should be met at all times,
"[i]t is generally accepted that to require standards maintenance
at all times is unreasonable. '37 0 This means that while dischargers
will still be held to the conditions of their permits, they will not be
required to cut back or take extraordinary measures to maintain
instream quality during periods of extreme low flow.37 1
Although the Water Quality Standards do not specify an "ac-
ceptable" flow level or a definitive means of determining appropri-
ate levels, they do contain relevant factors that must be weighed
when this aspect of a proposal is being considered. The General
Standard repeats the policy statement found at section 62.1-44.2 of
the Virginia Code.372  The Anti-Degradation Policy37 3 of the Code
368. The uses that are most susceptible to water quality degradation are recreation and
maintenance of a balanced population of fish and wildlife. Protection of these uses usually is
sufficient to protect others such as irrigation, navigation and industrial water supply. Id.
369. Id. § 1.03. This is usually expressed as the "7Q10", or the lowest flow which, on a
statistical basis, would occur for a seven consecutive day period once every ten years.
370. Id.
371. Interruptions in flow caused by impoundment or withdrawal can result in a stream
being at or near this stress condition for a significant part of the time, even during periods
of adequate rainfall. When that happens, what should be a relatively unusual phenomenon
within the stream's capacity to absorb becomes the norm, and the stream may be over-
stressed. Unfortunately, the "7Q10" is often used as the flow maintenance level, a function
for which it is inappropriate.
372. "All State waters shall be maintained at such quality as will permit all reasonable,
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requires that waters whose existing quality is better than the stan-
dards established for them be maintained at such quality. The
guidelines for implementing the policy include the requirement
that "[e]xisting instream beneficial water uses will be maintained
and protected, and actions that would interfere with or become in-
jurious to existing uses should not be undertaken. '374
The requirements of the State Water Control Law are not re-
stricted solely to discharges.37 5 Similarly, the requirements of the
Water Quality Standards, particularly those just mentioned, apply
to any activities that affect the chemical, physical or biological
characteristics of state waters. Thus, any activity that comes
within the Board's certification power or requires SWCB approval
must at least meet the requirements of the General Standard, the
Anti-Degradation policy where applicable, and the specific stan-
dards adopted for that stream. Because alterations in flow level
may affect the stream's ability to support beneficial uses as well as
its capacity to assimilate the effects of other activities such as
waste discharges, the Board must impose conditions on consump-
tive use or impoundment where appropriate to meet those statu-
tory and regulatory requirements. In many cases, the Board has
simply set the "7Q10 '3 76 as the average flow requirement; however,
this level may not necessarily meet the requirements of the SWCL
or of the standards.
Amendment of the Water Quality Standards to incorporate poli-
cies, requirements and procedures for establishment of instream
flows is an appropriate way to correct the lack of a coherent state
approach to this issue. While each case must still be weighed on its
own facts, this subject would be more appropriately treated by
agency rulemaking than by the current ad hoc approach.3 7 7 Al-
though the General Standard may be better than nothing, it is
prone to subjective interpretation, allows far too much discretion,
and from the standpoint of both the public and the regulated com-
beneficial uses and will support the propagation and growth of all aquatic life, including
game fish, which might reasonably be expected to inhabit them." Water Quality Standards,
supra note 363, § 1.01A.
373. Id. § 1.02 (repeating the policy of VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44).
374. Id.
375. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 369.
377. The State Water Plan Advisory Committee, established in 1983 pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.38, is charged with examining policy options on instream flows, among
other issues, and making recommendations to the Board.
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munity, gives little guidance on what to expect when planning, de-
signing or commenting on a given project.378
E. Common Law of Riparian Rights
Virginia, like most eastern states, determines water rights ac-
cording to the riparian doctrine. As a general rule under the ripa-
rian doctrine, owners of property bordering or crossed by a natural
stream have exclusive right to the reasonable use of the water in
that stream, provided that the use does not materially diminish or
pollute the stream to the detriment of other riparian owners.37 9
The right is an incident of property ownership and does not de-
pend upon its exercise; thus, the rights of riparian owners are pro-
tected regardless of whether the owners have exercised their rights
to use the water. Riparian owners hold their rights subject to cer-
tain public uses; the extent of the public use varies depending on
the jurisdiction.18 0 In Virginia, the extent of the public right has
been clearly established only with respect to navigation and its im-
provements, sl and to municipal sewage discharge. 2  Exercise of ri-
parian rights may be regulated by means of the police power, such
as the controls imposed on pollutant discharges.
In determining and enforcing rights among riparian owners, the
378. An example of the way in which this approach can reach a happy ending was seen
recently in the case of Vepco's application for a FERC permit to reactivate the Twelfth
Street Hydroelectric Power station in Richmond, a case that generated much public scru-
tiny and pressure. In order to protect fish habitat and spawning areas, the SWCB an-
nounced its intention to place minimum flow release conditions in the section 401 certifica-
tion, based on maintenance of a percentage of mean flow. Rationale for Instream Flow
Recommendation in the James River at the Proposed Twelfth Street Hydroplant (Oct. 19,
1982) (SWCB Staff Memorandum). This, in Vepco's opinion, made the plan uneconomical.
The authors agree entirely with the Board's action in that case, which represented a rather
more protective approach than the Agency has characteristically taken on this issue.
379. Town of Purceilville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 520-21, 19 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1942); Virginia
Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 130 S.E. 408 (1925).
380. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
381. Oliver v. City of Richmond, 165 Va. 538, 178 S.E. 48 (1935). Navigability in Virginia
is based narrowly on the commercial-use test. See Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89
S.E.2d 23 (1955). The public right to use streams that flow in privately-owned beds-even if
they are navigable in fact-does not, apparently, extend to recreational uses such as canoe-
ing, kayaking, fishing, etc. Some other states have included-either legislatively or judi-
cially-recreational uses within the scope of the public navigation right. See Watson, Public
Rights in Pennsylvania Waters, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 515 (1976); Cox, Public Recreational
Rights in Virginia's Inland Streams (Special Report No. 10, Virginia Water Resources Re-
search Center, VPI & SU) (Jan. 1980).
382. Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992
(1979).
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test to be applied in Virginia is whether the challenged use is un-
lawful and interferes unreasonably with the complainant's own
right to reasonable use of the waters flowing past or through his
property.38 3 No definite rule exists for determining what is or is not
a permissible use; this requires an examination of the facts in each
case.38 4 More importantly, the riparian doctrine is a private prop-
erty doctrine and is enforceable only by those having rights de-
rived from riparian ownership.
By its nature, therefore, the riparian right can provide a coinci-
dentally useful tool for protection of stream flows by the mecha-
nism of private owners protecting their rights. It is not, however, a
consistently reliable framework for protecting instream uses.
38 5
There are a number of situations where the common law, standing
alone, would be inadequate to protect instream flows despite a
clear public interest in doing so. For example, riparian rights may
be condemned or purchased, leaving no one to claim injury from
unlawful use. A riparian owner whose holdings are extensive may
divert the stream and return it to its course at the downstream end
of his property, causing damage to the watercourse but no actiona-
ble injury to other riparians. Riparian owners may be unaware of
unlawful diversions or may simply have no interest in spending the
time and money to pursue them. A diversion that may be consid-
ered non-injurious to riparian owners may in fact overstress the
stream. Assuming someone did assert the right, each new riparian
use would require a new judicial determination of "reasonable-
ness," and the courts would be guided primarily in each case by
property considerations rather than by technical standards for pro-
tection of the aquatic ecosystem.
Thus, while the riparian doctrine may be satisfactory as a means
of allocating rights among private users, its nature as a private
property right precludes its use, except coincidentally, as a means
of protecting stream flows for public purposes such as conserva-
tion, recreation and aquatic habitat protection. That is not to say
that the state does not have the authority to regulate stream flows
383. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700; 1972 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 79 (stating that an inter-
basin transfer of water, which diverts water beyond riparian property, is unlawful at com-
mon law).
384. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700; Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864, 83
S.E. 401 (1914). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1982) (discussing
the reasonable uses of water).
385. See Davis, The Riparian Right of Stream Flow Protection in the Eastern States, 36
ARK. L. REV. 47 (1982).
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for such purposes, but only that it derives no useful regulatory au-
thority from the common law riparian doctrine.38
The other question pertaining to the riparian doctrine's effect on
stream flow regulation is whether state-imposed flow requirements,
based on the police power, might be deemed an unconstitutional
taking of a riparian right. Although the constitutionality of a spe-
cific regulatory exercise challenged on this ground must be deter-
mined on the particular facts, it is difficult to conceive of a flow
maintenance regulation being overturned as a taking. An owner
holds his property subject to the lawful exercise of police power;
such exercise is deemed a taking only when it deprives the owner
of all reasonable uses of the property. The use preferred by the
owner is not necessarily constitutionally protected.38 7 Unless the
regulation prohibits use of water by riparian owners or deprives
them of all the beneficial incidents of their property, it would un-
doubtedly stand.
V. STATE PROGRAMS TO PROTECT INSTREAM FLOWS
State laws and regulations drawn specifically to protect instream
flows are still the exception rather than the rule, although interest
in developing flow protection programs has increased. 388 Allocation
systems historically have focused on the economic and property as-
pects of water use. Instream uses without definable economic value
have not fit comfortably into this perspective. Some states have
instituted programs to protect instream flow for public uses, how-
ever, and the issue appears to be attracting more interest as con-
sumptive uses compete increasingly with public demand for recrea-
tion, regulatory requirements for the protection of water quality
and habitat, the need for assimilative capacity to accommodate
multiple uses, and a more sophisticated awareness of the complex
ecology of freshwater aquatic systems. 9 Expanding interest in hy-
droelectric power, encouraged by rising energy costs and by new
386. Where the state is in fact a riparian owner, it has the same rights as any other owner
similarly situated. Thus, for example, it would be entitled to assert its riparian status to
protect a stream flowing through a state park.
387. Commonwealth v. County Utils., 223 Va. 534, 542, 290 S.E.2d 867, 872 (citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
388. See Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 547, 556-76 (1983) (summary of water rights in the eastern states); Davis,
supra note 385, at 48.
389. See generally Ausness, supra note 388.
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government incentives to small generators, 390 has also helped to el-
evate interest in the subject.
Several riparian doctrine states have instituted permit systems
to manage at least some aspects of water allocation.3 91 The require-
ment for a use permit, issued by a state administrative agency,
provides a ready mechanism for the imposition of flow mainte-
nance requirements as part of an overall management scheme.
However, the lack of clearly-stated legislative standards and poli-
cies would hamper the effectiveness of this approach; a permit re-
quirement alone is insufficient.
States that employ the prior-appropriation system of water allo-
cation, the system used by most western states, already have an
administrative mechanism in place, as this is necessary for the or-
derly functioning of the appropriation system. Instream flows may
be protected by the state's authority to deny an appropriation as
contrary to the public interest, by state appropriation for mainte-
nance of instream uses, by purchase or condemnation of appropri-
ated rights, by withdrawal of certain streams from appropriation,
or by imposing conditions on appropriation permits, transfers or
exchanges.92
390. The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2708 (1982), provides
incentives for small hydropower developers, for example, by requiring purchase of their
power by utilities. Other incentives include government surveys of potential power sites.
(See for example the 1981 Virginia Hydro Inventory, which lists 119 sites on Virginia
streams).
391. Maryland, for example, requires a permit from the Department of Natural Resources
to:
appropriate or use, or begin to construct any plant, building or structure which may
appropriate or use any waters of the state, whether surface or underground .... The
applicant shall provide the department with satisfactory proof that issuing the permit
will not violate the state's water quality standards or jeopardize its natural resources.
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-802 (Repl. Vol. 1983). The statute exempts domestic, agricul-
tural, and certain municipal uses. Id. Florida requires a permit for consumptive use and
construction and maintenance of dams and reservoirs. The permit must conform to a water
resources plan developed by the Department of Environmental Regulation and adminis-
tered by regional management districts. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.013 -.443 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1983). Delaware requires a permit for any increase in present use. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
7, § 6030 (1974). Iowa has the perhaps the most comprehensive program of any riparian
state, including establishment of flow standards, designation of "protected" streams and
administrative controls on withdrawals during drought periods. IOWA CODE ANN. §§
455B.261 -.280 (West Supp. 1983). See also Ausness, supra note 388, at 580.
392. See Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on
"New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211, 213-14; DEWSNUP & JENSEN,
supra note 351; and STATE LAWS AND INSTREAM FLOWS (1977) (published by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service); Heath, Protection of Instream Flows, in WALKER, LEGAL AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE SYSTEMS FOR WATER ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 107,
1984] STREAM FLOW MAINTENANCE
Systematic protection of instream flows in a riparian doctrine
state, such as Virginia, does not have to depend on a use permit
system, although such a program, properly administered, would al-
low a measure of protection more comprehensive than is otherwise
available.39 3  Most major non-consumptive activities affecting
stream flow usually require permits under state law (e.g., dam con-
struction permits)394 or state certification of water quality standard
compliance prior to issuance of a federal license or permit (e.g., a
FERC license or Corps of Engineers permit).3 9r Assuming that
there is adequate underlying authority, these permits can be condi-
tioned to include appropriate flow maintenance conditions. Ex-
plicit standards for instream flow protection have been set by some
states in their statutes governing these programs.3 96 Other states
have drawn upon the general water quality protection require-
ments of their environmental statutes and have promulgated regu-
lations requiring compliance with stream flow maintenance re-
quirements in permitted projects.39 7
113-16 (1984) (published by the Virginia Water Resources Research Center, VPI & SU).
393. Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky.
L. J. 191 (1977); Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Mis-
souri?, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429, 445-64 (1982). Issues and implications of a Virginia administra-
tive allocation system are discussed in detail in W. Cox, VIRGINIA'S WATER RESOURCES: POL-
ICY AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES (1982) (published by Virginia Water Resources Research
Center, VPI & SU); Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 24 WAI. &
MARY L. REV. 591 (1983). A withdrawal permit requirement, standing alone, does not neces-
sarily provide stream flow protection. The statute must provide sufficient authority and cri-
teria to ensure this protection is accomplished through the administration of the system.
394. See supra notes 237-97 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 262.
396. See, e.g., N.Y. ENvrTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-0801 to -0807 (McKinney Supp. 1983)
(requiring the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation to promulgate regulations for
certain impoundments respecting volume, timing, rate of change in volume and other condi-
tions on releases, to protect recreational uses, trout fishing, canoeing and other beneficial
uses). North Carolina's Dam Safety Law requires all dams subject to its provisions to
maintain flows sufficient to sustain stream classifications and water quality standards. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.25 to -215.37 (1983). Maryland requires hydroelectric dam operators
to release water sufficient to maintain water quality and aquatic habitat. MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 4-513 (RepI. Vol. 1983). See also Heath, supra note 392, at 111.
397. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources regulations provide that
[t]he Department will impose such general and special conditions regarding release
rates in any permit for a dam or reservoir as it deems necessary to maintain stream
flows for the purposes of protection of public health, water quality control, conserva-
tion of fisheries and aquatic habitat, improvement of recreation, and protection of
instream and downstream water uses.
Dam Safety and Waterway Management Rules and Regulations § 105.113. The regulations
provide that the minimum release rate cannot be less than the 7-day, 10-year low flow, but
that higher minimum flows must be set if necessary to protect particular instream flows. Id.
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Most eastern states, including Virginia, evaluate stream flow fac-
tors on a case-by-case basis whenever water quality factors are rel-
evant to the project in question.398 Determinations are guided by
the general statutory requirements of beneficial use protection and
the states' water quality standards. The statutory criteria, standing
alone, are rather subjective and do not provide much guidance,
particularly where competing beneficial uses are involved. Like-
wise, the water quality standards, as in Virginia,"' may be either
so general as to be of little guidance or so specific as to be inappli-
cable. Absent criteria specific to stream flow maintenance consider-
ations, the decision in each case may be arbitrary, as in the
SWCB's general practice of applying the "7Q10, 400 or may reflect
inconsistent factors. For example, there are numerous technically
acceptable formulas for establishing base flow standards. 0 1 The re-
sults of using any one in a given case may vary considerably, to the
extent of making the difference between project feasibility and in-
feasibility at one extreme0 2 or to the extent of causing serious
stream damage at the other. While specific technical recommenda-
tions are beyond the scope of this article, it seems clear that a reg-
ulatory approach falling between the vagaries of the general stan-
dard and a single numerical formula with statewide applicability is
advisable. In some cases, a numerical formula may be adequate; in
others, for example, where the stream is a critical habitat, exten-
sive and costly instream analysis may be necessary.
398. Davis, supra note 385, at 48; Heath, supra note 392, at 110.
399. See supra notes 362-78 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 369. This approach has been found wanting elsewhere. For example,
the Report of the 1982 Instream Flow Workshop, sponsored by the Illinois Division of
Water Resources and Illinois Department of Conservation, noted with evident dissatisfac-
tion that
the only standard which has periodically been used in the part to condition some
major water withdrawal permits was the "water quality standard" flow of 7-day Q10.
This standard has been recommended mainly because it is the 'only' low flow stan-
dard in general use even though it is widely recognized as wholly inappropriate.
REPORT OF INSTREAM FLOW WORKSHOP (1982).
401. See Gregory, supra note 3, which describes sixteen methods for establishing base
flow standards.
402. The Illinois workshop report, for example, found that use of the "Montana Method,"
a widely-accepted method which is based on preserving a percentage of mean annual flow,
would result in "the prohibition of virtually any surface water supply developments in cen-
tral and southern Illinois." REPORT OF INSTREAM FLOW WORKSHOP (1982). However, the
method has been used successfully in numerous cases and under different conditions, and
has been employed extensively by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. W. Cox, SPEcIAL RE-
PORT TO THE VIRGINIA STATE WATER STUDY COMMISSION ON WATER SUPPLY MANAGEMENT IN
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 17-18 (1980) (published by VPI & SU).
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VI. CURRENT VIRGINIA AQUATIC BASEFLOW POLICY
At present, the State Water Control Board (SWCB) has no for-
mally adopted flow policy or requirements. As described above, the
SWCB has arbitrarily used the "7Q10" as the minimum acceptable
flow which could be certified not to contravene water quality stan-
dards.0 3 Legislation in the 1981 General Assembly4 4 directed the
SWCB to determine the minimum instream flows necessary during
drought conditions to maintain water quality and to avoid perma-
nent damage to aquatic life in streams, bays and estuaries. This is
a less than clear charge for establishment of aquatic base flow reg-
ulations, but the Board has interpreted the directive to mean that
it should investigate the difference between flows that are designed
not to contravene minimum water quality standards and flows that
might actually be required to maintain instream biota for other
reasons.
During 1982, sixteen techniques for the evaluation of instream
flows needed for the maintenance of fish and aquatic life were re-
viewed by the SWCB.4 °5 A modification of the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Interim Regional Policy for New England Flow Recommenda-
tions406 was considered to be the most appropriate method for
Virginia, since the objective of study was to determine a uniform
statewide policy that could be based on existing stream flow data.
Computer studies for ninety stations on unregulated streams es-
tablished that September median flows were the lowest of the year
and were consistently higher than the 7Q10 flow.40 7 Using the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service New England methodology, September
median flows were recommended for establishment as the aquatic
base flow, although flows during the spring spawning periods may
be more critical.40 8 Hence higher, tiered flows might be required
during these periods.
Using the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service New England method-
ology, aquatic base flow was also determined for streams with in-
adequate flow records. Correlation of the policy with streams hav-
ing historical gauging records yielded a method of determining
403. See supra note 369.
404. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.38 (RepI. Vol. 1982).
405. Gregory, supra note 3.
406. H.N. LARSEN, INTERIM REGIONAL POLICY FOR NEW ENGLAND STREAM FLOW RECOM-
MENDATIONS (1981) (published by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
407. Gregory, supra note 3. See also supra note 369 (definition of 7Q10 flow).
408. Gregory, supra note 3.
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aquatic base flow based on multiplying the square miles of drain-
age area of the stream segment by 0.26 cubic feet per second of
flow.
4 0 9
In another experiment, the SWCB used the "Montana
Method"41 0 to determine the minimum instream flow value neces-
sary to maintain a good habitat for aquatic life and to allow fish
passage in the James River below the proposed reactivation of the
Virginia Electric and Power Company Twelfth Street Hydro Power
Plant in Richmond. 41' This method yielded a figure similar to that
of an independent study of fish passages for the project done for
the Virginia Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries.412 Both
minimum flows were over three times the 7Q10 flow for that seg-
ment of the James River.413
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The State Water Control Board needs no additional statutory
authority to promulgate regulations prescribing stream flow main-
tenance requirements for consumptive uses and impoundments.
The policies set forth in the Code and in article XI of the Virginia
Constitution 414 provide strong underpinning for the assertion that
the SWCB is not only authorized but required to regulate activities
materially affecting stream flows where to do otherwise would con-
travene beneficial public uses. In those cases where Board certifica-
tion is nonetheless required, such as Clean Water Act section 401
certification for impoundments and other federally-licensed
projects,415 the SWCB usually does include flow conditions al-
though they are almost always based on the seven day ten year low
flow (7Q10). 416 The SWCB does not have even this minimal crite-
rion for setting rates to protect the receiving stream from excessive
409. Id.
410. The "Montana Method," supra note 402, yields a figure of 30% of the historic mean
annual flow.
411. R.E. BOWLES, RECOMMENDED INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENT IN THE JAMES RIVER BE-
LOW THE TWELFTH STREET HYDROPLANT (1983) (published by the Virginia State Water Con-
trol Board).
412. B. Rizzo, Preliminary Report on the Feasibility of Constructing Fish Passage Facili-
ties at Dams on the James River in Richmond 10 (March 1983), reprinted in ExEcuTIVE
SUMMARY: FEASIBILITY STUDY OF FISH PASSAGE FACILITIES IN THE JAMES RIVER, RICHMOND,
VIRGINIA (Prepared for the Virginia Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries).
413. R.E. BOWLES, supra note 411.
414. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
415. See supra note 262.
416. See supra note 369.
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fluctuations in releases.
Where the SWCB bases its conditions on the 7Q10, the project's
compliance with the requirements of the SWCL and consequently
the Board's fulfillment of its statutory and constitutional responsi-
bilities are fortuitous. The level is based, not on the stream's abil-
ity to support beneficial uses, but on the benchmark for water
quality standard compliance by individual dischargers. Growing
dissatisfaction in other states with use of the 7Q10 as a generic
standard for flow maintenance, as well as the demonstrated inade-
quacy of the method in cases such as the Twelfth Street Hydro-
power Project,41 1 indicates that a better method is needed. It is
encouraging that the SWCB is at least considering a more rational
policy for aquatic baseflow requirements, 1 8 and that rulemaking
appears likely. In the meantime, the SWCB should approach indi-
vidual cases on their own merits and avoid arbitrary application of
the 7Q10.
The Board has no procedures or requirements for ensuring
maintenance of adequate flows where a consumptive use or other
use not requiring a discharge permit or a federal license requiring
section 401 certification is involved. While it is true that the Board
does not have the authority to allocate water supplies, it does have
the authority and duty to prevent actions that may result in con-
travention of instream uses. Concededly, imposition of a with-
drawal permit system is probably not feasible. However, such a
permit system is not necessary to a flow protection regime. The
Board may issue regulations prohibiting withdrawals that would
violate water quality standards linked to reporting requirements of
the State Water Control Law.4 19 This would provide a regulatory
handle for application in specific cases, without establishing the
across-the-board restrictions on withdrawal that are inherent in a
permit system.
Although comprehensive answers to Virginia water management
issues may yet be years away, there is no need to follow an all or
nothing approach, merely forestalling action on everything while
waiting for the most unattainable part (an administrative alloca-
tion system) to fall into place. Stream flow protection ideally may
be addressed as part of an overall state water plan, but it is neither
necessary nor wise to wait for that development. The statutory
417. R.E. BOWLES, supra note 411.
418. See supra notes 405-13 and accompanying text.
419. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.38(c) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
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mandates provide ample authority for rulemaking to establish
statewide regulatory policies and requirements. The most effective
approach, in the opinion of the authors, would be to establish a
conservative standard, based on objective criteria, for statewide
application, with well-defined variance provisions and procedures
to allow case-by-case flexibility. The burden of obtaining the vari-
ance would fall upon the applicant or user. Where a more stringent
standard is required in a particular case, the Board would have the
authority to set a special standard or to impose stricter conditions
based on demonstrated need. The standard could be supplemented
by flow levels designed for specific streams, but would not be de-
pendent on completion of that task.42 °
This approach is similar to that used for applying water quality
standards. 421 By placing the burden upon the applicant to show
why the underlying conservative standard should be modified, this
approach allows flexibility where appropriate but recognizes the
fundamental orientation of interests involved. The result is more
likely to protect the public interest in most cases, but still will al-
low the applicant a reasonable degree of certainty. This contem-
plates no change in Virginia's common law system of allocating
private rights.422 Instead, it supplements the shortcomings of the
allocation system by strengthening the Commonwealth's ability to
protect public rights to maximum beneficial use of a resource on
which all life depends.
420. These are to be developed for all major stream basins in Virginia under the require-
ments of id. § 62.1-44.38(B).
421. See, e.g., Water Quality Standards, supra note 363, §§ 1.04-1.08 (water quality stan-
dard for temperature).
422. Tarlock, Introduction to Proceedings of Virginia Water Rights Symposium, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 535, 538 (1983).
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